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MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LITIGATION (U.S.)-
MEDICAL MISHAP COMPENSATION (N.Z.)
Walter Gellhornt
Ours is an era of rising expectations concerning health care.
Miracle drugs, death-defying surgical procedures, and demystifica-
tion of the genes have become the almost daily diet of newspaper
readers. Nowadays, successful outcomes of what in days past would
have been lost causes have aroused in many laypersons a perhaps
excessively fervid faith in the efficacy of medico-surgical efforts.
As in most other human affairs, the hopes of the faithful are
often disappointed. Medico-surgical realities do not measure up to
expectations. What then?
This paper considers two approaches to coping with the conse-
quences of medico-surgical failure. In the United States, law seeks
to provide monetary solace if it can trace the failure's cause to a
blameworthy person or organization. In New Zealand, blame is ir-
relevant. A social insurance plan provides compensation for all per-
sonal injuries arising out of accidents, including medical mishaps,
whatever may have been their cause.
The discussion that follows does not advocate one or another of
the two approaches. The purpose is, rather, to underscore
problems that require close attention, whichever be the approach
taken.
I
MALPRACTICE LITIGATION IN THE UNITED STATES
In the United States, medical malpractice litigation has become
epidemic rather than episodic. It reflects all manner of dissatisfac-
tions on the part of patients (or their survivors) with the perform-
ance or nonperformance of medical, hospital, or staff personnel-
venality or venery, incompetence or inattentiveness, negligence or
neglectfulness, faulty diagnosis or faulty equipment. The range of
alleged failures on the part of presumably well trained persons is
indeed impressive.
Even so, the claims made are far fewer than they might be.
Some years ago a rather limited survey of the records of reasonably
representative hospitals suggested that seven and one-half percent
t University Professor Emeritus, Columbia University School of Law.
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of the persons who had been discharged after having received medi-
cal treatment had apparently been injured by it. Twenty-nine per-
cent of these injuries, according to the survey, stemmed from
negligence on the part of a health care provider.' Only a few per-
sons who had suffered from this negligence, however, sought re-
dress; the others accepted their fate because ignorant of having
cause to complain or because the time and trouble and tension a
contest would involve outweighed the possible satisfaction of gain-
ing compensation. 2 Still, the claims that were formally expressed
were numerous.
Claims, outcomes, and costs. During 1984 (the latest year for which
comprehensive statistics are readily at hand) the American insur-
ance industry closed approximately 73,500 malpractice claims
against 103,300 health care providers.3  Fewer than half-forty-
three percent-of the settled claims led to compensatory payments.
The median payment was $18,000; the nine percent of the paid
claims closed by payment of indemnities of $250,000 or more raised
the average to $80,741. The largest single payment in 1984 was
$2.5 million; the lowest was $1. The total for the year was $2.6 bil-
lion-to which must be added the more than $800 million the insur-
ance companies expended in investigating and defending against
the claims closed.
4
According to some estimates, somewhat less than half of the
1 See Pocincki, Dogger & Schwartz, The Incidence of latrogenic Injuries, in U.S. DEP'T
OF HEALTH, EDUC. AND WELFARE, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND
WELFARE'S COMMISSION ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE app. 50, 55, 62, 63 (DHEW Pub. No.
(OS) 73-89, 1973). A California study commissioned a few years later by that state's
medical and hospital associations put the figures a bit lower-adverse medical outcomes
were noted in 4.65 percent of hospital discharges, and negligence had at least arguably
occurred in 17 percent of those cases. MEDICAL INSURANCE FEASIBILITY STUDY 50-51,
103-05 (D. Mills ed. 1977). This study has been summarized in Mills, Medical Insurance
Feasibility Study--A Technical Summary, 128 WESTERN J. MED. 360 (1978).
2 Data evidencing underlitigation are explained in W. SCHWARTZ & N. KOMESAR,
DOCTORS, DAMAGES AND DETERRENCE: AN ECONOMIC VIEW OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
11-12 (Rand, R-2340NIH/RC, 1978). A sampling that concentrated on persons injured
while undergoing "high risk" medical treatments in hospitals showed that 61.2 percent
of "adverse events" were of a "minor temporary nature." Only 1.1 percent were of a
"major permanent total" or "grave permanent total" nature. HARVARD MEDICAL PRAC-
TICE STUDY GROUP, MEDICAL CARE AND MEDICAL INJURIES IN THE STATE OF NEW YORK: A
PILOT STUDY 66 (1987) [hereinafter N.Y. PILOT STUDY].
3 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: CHARACTERISTICS OF
CLAIMS CLOSED IN 1984, at 2 (GAO/HRD-87-55, Apr. 1987) [hereinafter APR. 1987
GAO REPORT]. Eighty percent of the claims closed by insurance companies in 1984
related to injuries that had occurred in hospitals; approximately 13 percent had oc-
curred in doctors' offices. Id. at 25 table 2.8.
4 Id. at 2. The median and average costs of investigating and defending against
claims closed in 1984 were $2,390 and $10,985, respectively. Id. at 2, 21, 22. Defense
attorneys received almost 83 percent of the companies' costs (about $668 million out of
a total of $807 million). Id. at 21.
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total amount of the liability insurance premiums that health care
providers pay reaches the pockets of claimants after insurance prov-
iders have made expenditures for claims administration and other
corporate purposes. 5 Of the portion of the medical malpractice in-
surance dollar that does reach the claimant after litigation, more-
over, barely half, according to data analyzed a decade ago, remains
in the claimant's pocket after he has paid all expenses, which include
attorneys' and expert witnesses' fees. 6 Apart from the immediate
parties' expenditures, account must still be taken of the direct outlay
of public dollars for judicial and administrative services to litigants,
wholly distinct from additional long-term social costs resulting from
under-compensation in some instances 7 and, in others, spectacular
over-compensation that may stimulate excessive combativeness in
pursuit of a grand lottery prize.8
Claims settling is not a speedy process in most instances. In
5 Sugarman, Doing Away with Tort Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 555, 596 (1985). Esti-
mates of what claimants actually received vary greatly, ranging from as low as 18 percent
to a high of 54 percent of the premium dollar. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV-
ICES, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON MEDICAL LIABILITY AND MALPRACTICE 16 (Aug.
1987) [hereinafter HHS TASK FORCE REPORT].
6 SeeJ. KAKALICK & N. PACE, COSTS AND COMPENSATION PAID IN TORT LITIGATION
68-76 (1986).
7 Fifty-seven percent of the 73,500 medical malpractice claims that were closed in
1984 produced no payments at all, and many of the payments made in the remaining
cases were for petty amounts. APR. 1987 GAO REPORT, supra note 3, at 2. Malpractice
claimants whose demonstrable economic losses exceeded $100,000 received from the
insurers less than the amounts lost, while those whose losses ranged from zero to
$49,999 often received payments substantially greater than the actual economic loss. Id.
at 44-45. Some years ago an analyst of recoveries by plaintiffs in automobile accident
cases remarked, in terms that may be pertinent to medical malpractice cases as well, that
"the fault system tends toward over-compensation in the small cases, while in big dam-
age cases very few victims get as much as twenty-five per cent of their real economic
loss." Franklin, Replacing the Negligence Lottery: Compensation and Selective Reimbursement, 53
VA. L. REV. 774, 780 (1967).
8 Until 1985 the largest malpractice award in North Carolina had been $200,000.
In March 1985 a jury awarded $6.5 million. A medical mutual insurance company offi-
cial reportedly feared this might "set a benchmark for future cases. The official attrib-
uted the larger awards and settlements to an increasing public awareness of the benefits
of pursuing a claim [and] more aggressive plaintiff attorneys.. ." U.S. GEN. ACCOUNT-
ING OFFICE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: 6 STATE CASE STUDIES SHOW CLAIMS AND COSTS
STILL RISE DESPITE REFORMS 39 (GAO/HRD-87-2 1, Dec. 1986) [hereinafter DEC. 1986
GAO REPORT]. The unpredictability ofjury verdicts is said also to be an element of the
lottery. The "lottery" figure of speech reflects reality. In the period 1980-1984 the
average jury award in malpractice cases in Cook County, Illinois, was $1,179,000 (in 1984
dollars), when juries awarded anything at all. The big verdicts in 67 cases during those
four years accounted for 85 percent of the total amount that Cook County juries
awarded in 1980-1984; all the other successful suitors had to divide a small pot rather
than gain a grand prize; and, plainly, the unsuccessful suitors won nothing at all. M.
PETERSON, CIVILJURIES IN THE 1980s: TRENDS INJURY TRIALS AND VERDICTS IN CALIFOR-
NIA AND COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS 21, 32-34 (RAND R-3466-ICJ, 1987). Manyjury awards
are substantially pared by later court orders or by negotiations before any payments are
actually made. The dollar amounts just stated do not consider subsequent reductions.
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1984 a few cases were disposed of within a month, but the median
time from filing to closing was twenty-three months, and the time
elapse for those cases closed with an indemnity payment was often
greater. Moreover, the cases that were generated by the more seri-
ous injuries and that led to the largest 'compensatory payments
lingered even longer, some of them more than ten years.9
Efforts to curb costs. During recent years the federal and state
governments have made strong efforts to curb costs associated with
alleged medical malpractice, to expedite and improve decisions.
when contests arise, and to assure continuation of health services
that had seemed jeopardized by mounting insurance costs borne by
prudent health care providers. That problems existed was indispu-
table. What to do about them was uncertain.
Medical malpractice insurance rates rose to levels that led some
doctors to retire or to avoid practicing in high-risk fields.10 In a
number of states in 1986 the annual premium for obstetricians ex-
ceeded $30,000, a discouragingly high figure for medically trained
personnel who were considering a career choice; the cost of insur-
ance for neurosurgeons, orthopedists, and others was not far be-
hind, and sometimes was ahead." In 1985 obstetricians and
gynecologists in parts of Florida paid annual premiums of $185,460;
the national average for that group was $23,300.12
Some legislatures were persuaded that insurance costs could
and should be reduced by imposing a limit upon the amount recov-
9 APR. 1987 GAO REPORT, supra note 3, at 4; see also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OF-
FICE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: No AGREEMENT ON THE PROBLEMS OR SOLUTIONS 4
(GAO/HRD-86-50, Feb. 1986) [hereinafter FEB. 1986 GAO REPORT] (organization of
health care providers stated that "some patients were delaying their recovery, at the
encouragement of their attorneys, to maximize damages").
10 See infra note 94.
11 See DEC. 1986 GAO REPORT, supra note 8, at 16 table 2.2. The Association of
Trial Lawyers of America, however, reportedly regarded medical malpractice liability
insurance as not overly expensive, when considered in light of what the Association said
was the average gross income of physicians ($200,000). See FEB. 1986 GAO REPORT,
supra note 9, at 26. Other inquiries have shown that the cost of insurance is a minor
though still substantial element of the physician's total overhead expenses. In 1984, the
average for all self-employed physicians was 9 percent of the "cost of doing business,"
but was greater for those in the "high-risk specialties." Obstetricians and gynecologists
expended 8 percent of their gross income for insurance. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: INSURANCE COSTS INCREASED BUT VARIED AMONG PHY-
SICIANS AND HOSPITALS 3-4 (GAO/HRD-86-112, Sept. 1986) [hereinafter SEPT. 1986
GAO REPORT].
12 HHS TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 5, at 14. The most elaborate presentation
of material related to the "rapidly expanding crisis" appears in U.S. TORT POLICY WORK-
ING GROUP, REPORT OF THE TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP ON THE CAUSES, EXTENT AND
POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE CURRENT CRISIS IN INSURANCE AVAILABILITY AND AF-
FORDABILITY (Feb. 1986) [hereinafter TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP REPORT]. The Tort
Policy Working Group was established by the Attorney General in 1985; its members are
drawn from ten agencies and the White House.
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erable by an injured person. This pleased the insurers and the in-
sured, but gave rise to constitutional controversies (with diverse
outcomes) 13 as well as under-compensation for some of those who
had been severely injured.
Because submitting complex medical issues to technically ill-
equipped jurors seemed to many persons unwise, even though most
state constitutions enshrine the "right to trial by jury," various
states required that contested claims be initially scrutinized by
panels whose members included health professionals. The judg-
ment of a panel, the legislators thought, would influence the parties
to settle disagreements. Thus far that hope has not been fulfilled.
In some states lawyers contend that the panel proceeding has be-
come simply a time-consuming step that delays final disposition of
cases without improving the end result.
In yet other states, moves have been made to limit attorneys'
fees, shorten the statutory period within which a suit for damages
must be commenced, provide for periodic payments in place of
large lump sums, require reduction of awards for payments a claim-
ant has received from other sources (such as private insurance or
workers' compensation), and eliminate the ad damnum segment of a
formal complaint. 14 The efficacy of these various "reforms" has not
13 See Note, The Constitutionality of Medical Malpractice Legislative Reform: A National
Survey, 18 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 1053 (1987) (authored by Larry Stephen Milner); NoteJudi-
cial Review of Medical Malpractice Legislation, 20 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 523 (1986) (authored
by William N. Erickson). Compare Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 941-43, 424 A.2d
825, 836-38 (1985) (invalidating statutory limitation on amount recoverable for
noneconomic consequences of medical malpractice) with Fein v. Permanente Medical
Group, 38 Cal. 3d 137, 695 P.2d 665 (upholding cap on awards for pain and suffering),
appeal dismissed, 474 U.S. 892 (1985). According to Huber, Injury Litigation and Liability
Insurance Dynamics, 238 Sci., Oct. 2, 1987, at 31, 35, "Capping liability payouts has had
some demonstrable impact in the few instances where strict rules have been put in
place"-20 percent decrease or more. HHS TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 5, at 121-
35, provides an excellent overview of changes in state laws and court decisions bearing
on malpractice claims.
14 In an ad damnum clause, the plaintiff specifies the relief he seeks. One presumes
that the elimination of this clause is designed to discourage dull-witted jurors or news-
paper readers from taking seriously a statement that a podiatrist who negligently re-
moved an ingrown toenail should pay $20,000,000 to compensate for having caused the
plaintiff physical and emotional distress and lastingly impaired his ability to race in the
Boston Marathon. At least 31 states prohibit any statement of the amount of damages
claimed. HHS TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 5, at 125. For a report of recent legisla-
tive responses to the liability insurance crisis, see NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLA-
TURES, RESOLVING THE LIABILITY INSURANCE CRISIS: STATE LEGISLATIVE ACTIVITIES IN
1986 (July 1986). For a useful discussion of earlier legislative modifications of pre-ex-
isting tort law, see Kemper, Selby & Simmons, Reform Revisited: A Review of the Indiana
Malpractice Act Ten Years Later, 19 IND. L. REV. 1129 (1986) [hereinafter Kemper]; Trebil-
cock, The Social Insurance-Deterrence Dilemma of Modern North American Tort Law: A Canadian
Perspective on the Liability Insurance Crisis, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 929 (1987); see also APR.
1987 GAO REPORT, supra note 3, at 3, 38; Robinson, The Medical Malpractice Crisis of the
1970's: A Retrospective, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1986, at 5, 18-26.
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yet been thoroughly confirmed by empirical data. 15
Social purposes of malpractice actions. Why does a system survive,
despite being extremely costly in dollars-and-cents and yet far from
demonstrably efficient in fairly or fully recompensing those who
have been injured by a health care provider's asserted fault? Why is
persuading an inexpert jury that some identifiable fault in the
course of medical treatment caused a claimant's injury deemed to be
an essential element of any plan to deal financially with the conse-
quences of the injury?
A cynic might remark, by way of answer, that lawyers and insur-
ance companies benefit financially from things as they are, and
therefore resist change.' 6 That explanation has substance, but is a
gross oversimplification. Most of those who favor (or at least accept
without demur) the present system of malpractice litigation sin-
cerely ascribe to it benign effects and principled purposes; their be-
lief in those effects and purposes should not be summarily
dismissed.
15 See Danzon, The Effects of Tort Reforms on the Frequency and Severity of Medical Mal-
practice Claims, 48 OHIo ST. L.J. 413 (1987). Compare P. DANZON, THE FREQUENCY AND
SEVERITY OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS (1982) (dollar caps and offset by collateral
sources reduced severity of malpractice claims, but evidence shows no connection be-
tween reforms and decline in frequency of claims) and Danzon, The Frequency and Severity
of Medical Malpractice Claims: New Evidence, 49 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1986, at
57 [hereinafter Danzon, New Evidence] (concluding that some changes, such as offsetting
collateral benefits, shortening statute of limitations, and capping awards, had in fact re-
duced claim frequency or claim severity, but that pre-trial screening panels had been
ineffective) with Sloan, State Responses to the Malpractice Insurance "Crisis" of the 1970s: An
Empirical Assessment, 9 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & LAw 629, 640 (1985) (showing that of all
the "reforms" only the mandatory use of screening panels could be said to have had a
statistically significant impact on malpractice insurance premiums) and DEC. 1986 GAO
REPORT, supra note 8, at 18 (reporting that "[w]ith few exceptions, the reforms were
perceived by the organizations surveyed as having no major impact on the number of
claims filed or the size of awards and settlements."). Grad, Medical Malpractice and the
Crisis of Insurance Availability: The Waning Options, 36 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 1058, 1076-85
(1986), is an especially insightful description and appraisal of the various "crisis" enact-
ments. At present a not yet successful attempt to transfer malpractice claims from the
realm of tort law to the realm of contract law is discernible. See, e.g., Atiyah, Medical
Malpractice and the Contract/Tort Boundary, 49 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1986, at
287; Epstein, Medical Malpractice, Imperfect Information, and the Contractual Foundation for
Medical Services, 49 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1986, at 261; Ginsburg, Kahn,
Thornhill & Gambardella, Contractual Revisions to Medical Malpractice Liability, 49 LAW &
COrrEMP. PROBS., Spring 1986, at 253.
16 See, e.g., Pierce, Institutional Aspects of Tort Reform, 73 CALIF. L. REv. 917, 918
(1985) (referring to "the existence of powerful vested interests opposing change").
No consensus is likely to develop because neither potential accident vic-
tims nor society at large has an effective voice in the lawmaking process.
Two groups that have much greater ability to affect that process-trial
lawyers and insurance companies-perceive significant advantages in the
present system and oppose most reforms vigorously. Any attempt to re-
form tort law must recognize and deal with these obstacles.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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An able American Bar Association committee, whose commen-
taries were written by one of this country's outstanding professors
of tort law, suggested as recently as 1984 that "the right of citizens
to bring suit for private wrongs, reinforced by widespread knowl-
edge of that right, provides an important outlet for conflict that
otherwise would break into violence." 17 The development of liabil-
ity for fault in the mid-nineteenth century' 8 reflected a moral senti-
ment, by no means now extinct, that justice (however it be defined)
demands that the doer of an injurious act compensate an innocent
person who has suffered as a direct consequence of that act. 19
As the ABA committee acknowledged, the rise of liability insur-
ance and the development of social mechanisms for dealing with the
immediate economic and medical impacts of personal injury have
attenuated the "raw emotions" of times long past. Yet the conten-
tion that tort law, "as an interstitial resolver" of individual contro-
versies, serves "both as a grievance mechanism at a level of
advanced social development and as a brake on the overt conflict
that may break through the crust of civilization when injury victims
have reason to believe that society is not responding justly to their
plight" is still plausible.20
Many thoughtful analysts now reject the conventional hypothe-
sis that systematically affixing individual liability for a fault injurious
to another serves these two great social purposes-avoidance of
17 ABA SPECIAL COMM. ON THE TORT LIABILITY SYSTEM, TOWARDS A JURISPRUDENCE
OF INJURY: THE CONTINUING CREATION OF A SYSTEM OF SUBSTANTIVE JUSTICE IN AMERI-
CAN TORT LAW 3-16 (with commentaries by Marshall S. Shapo, Nov. 1984) [hereinafter
ABA REPORT].
18 See, e.g., Brown v. Kendall, 60 Mass. 292 (1850); Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in
Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537, 561 (1972).
19 But see G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALY-
sS 301 (1970): "It strikes critic and community as unfair ifa person injured by someone
who has violated a moral code is not compensated, or if someone who violates a moral
code and is hurt is compensated, at the expense of an innocent party." The author does
not, however, believe that "rather undifferentiated notions ofjustice" do in reality sup-
port "the fault system," based as it purports to be on "a simplistic bilateral view of the
accident problem." He concludes that
the moment one accepts the notion that justice does not require that an
individual injurer compensate his individual victim-and the allowance of
insurance for faulty parties is clear indication that this notion is ac-
cepted-and the moment one realizes that wrongdoers can be punished
for wrongful acts quite apart from whether they must compensate victims,
it becomes very hard to see how the fault system can be supported on
grounds of justice.
Id. at 302-03. Compare Gregory, Trespass to Negligence to Absolute Liability, 37 VA. L. REV.
359, 396, 397 (1951) ("growth of insurance with its possibilities of risk-spreading and
loss absorption, has changed our social context as much as any other single develop-
ment"). But cf TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 10, at 30-33 (extolling
the concept of fault).
20 ABA REPORT, supra note 17, at 3-18.
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vengeful violence and fulfillment of the community's sense of right
and wrong. Guido Calabresi, dean of the Yale law faculty, for exam-
ple, believes that American society has long been wholly ready "to
abandon the view that justice requires individual injurers to pay
their victims on the basis of fault and . . . , moreover, wherever an
adequate alternative has been presented, people have tended to
prefer it to the traditional fault system," 2 1 as shown, for example, by
the general acceptance of workers' compensation laws that provide
limited but assured compensation for employment-related injuries
regardless of fault. The prevalence and acceptability of insurance,
Calabresi adds, "strongly suggests that we do not worry too much
about whether the individual faulty party pays his victim, so long as
the victim is paid."'22 In Dean Calabresi's view,
justice will support the fault system only if there is no sensible
alternative system presented, only if the choice is solely between
crushing one relatively wrongful and one relatively innocent
party.... [T]he moral aims of our society, and even our undiffer-
entiated sense of justice, can be better met through systems that
concentrate on the deterrence and compensation we want than
through an archaic system of liability that presumes an organiza-
tion of society in which the best that can be done is to treat each
accident... as a universe unto itself.
23
Tort law as a necessary deterrent. A third justification of the tort
system's approach to adverse effects of medical attention (or inat-
tention) is the widespread belief, shared by the American Bar Asso-
ciation's special committee, that it "provides a significant, and
necessary, deterrent against incompetent and careless rendition of
medical services."
24
The soundness of that view has been increasingly challenged in
recent decades. Insurance forestalls the individualized impact of a
jury's conclusion that a health care provider has been at fault. Indi-
vidual defendants may suffer costs in terms of lost time and, as is
often said, emotional wounds; but payment of a damage award
against an identified defendant is made from a pooled fund of insur-
ance premiums, rather than from the funds of the asserted wrong-
doer. Hence the possibility that gigantic personal liability will bring
financial ruin is negated in this context. That possibility may once
have been a true threat, but it is no longer likely to be wholly effec-
tive as a deterrent in the real world of today.25
21 G. CALABRESI, supra note 19, at 304.
22 Id. at 305.
23 Id. at 307.
24 ABA REPORT, supra note 17, at 11-32.
25 See Fleming, The Role of Negligence in Modern Tort Law, 53 VA. L. REV. 815, 823-24
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Nevertheless, the desire to avoid involvement in litigation re-
mains even without the threat of large financial losses. This, accord-
ing to some, has induced many physicians to engage in costly
"defensive medicine," characterized by excessive tests and superflu-
ous procedures, to preclude any possibility of later being accused of
having neglected measures that just conceivably might have been
helpful to the patient. 26 Other medical personnel have abandoned
practice altogether in order to lessen their own exposure to
litigation.
27
(1967) ("The deterrent function of the law of torts was severely, perhaps fatally, under-
mined by the advent of liability insurance."). But see P. DANZON, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
ch. 7 (1985); cf. S. SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAw 292 (1987) (though
acknowledging "the relative lack of statistical study" of extent to which prospect of lia-
bility really deters, and need to "rely mainly on intuition" in considering that matter,
author concludes that a person's being protected by liability insurance does not alto-
gether undo deterrent effect of liability on behavior).
By and large, malpractice insurance rates are fixed for a class rather than for an
individual. "Merit rating" of individuals, which leads to differentials in rates or other
aspects of the insurance policy, is practiced by some though by no means all insurers. A
recent Massachusetts statute has mandated merit rating for the bulk of the insured
health care providers in that state. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 175A, § 5A (West
1987). The underlying theory is that this will personalize insurance costs sufficiently to
stimulate greater care. Information concerning insurance rates, practices, and claims
costs is excellently summarized in HHS TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 5, at 145-78; see
also SEPT. 1986 GAO REPORT, supra note 11, at 14-15 (brief summary of factors influenc-
ing rates and type of policies).
26 See SEPT. 1986 GAO REPORT, supra note 11, at 13. Defensive medicine has in-
cluded not only additional diagnostic tests and treatment procedures, but also more
elaborate patient records, more frequent follow-up visits by patients to their doctors,
and more time spent with each patient. The American Medical Association stated that
these steps were not being dictated by medical considerations, and were of marginal
benefit to patients and unjustifiably costly. The Association of Trial Lawyers of America,
on the other hand, regarded all of this as simply "careful medicine," not "defensive
medicine." Id. The GAO remarked: "The cost of defensive medicine is impossible to
quantify with any degree of confidence because of the difficulty in developing a sound
methodology to isolate 'defensive' practices from medical care provided for good
clinical reasons." Id. A recent study estimated that the cost came to $10.6 billion in
1984, accounting for 18 percent of what was spent for all physicians' services in that
year. See Reynolds, Rizzo & Gonzalez, The Cost of Medical Professional Liability, 257 J.
A.M.A. 2776, 2778 (1987). For skeptical appraisal of the problem of defensive
medicine, see Robinson, Rethinking the Allocation of Medical Malpractice Risks between Patients
and Providers, 49 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1986, at 172, 176-78. For a far more
cynical analysis, see Fine & Sunshine, Malpractice Reform Through Consumer Choice and Con-
sumer Education: Are New Concepts Marketable?, 49 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1986,
at 213, 215-217. 'See also MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 22, 27-28, 32-33 (D. Yaggy & P. Hodg-
son eds. 1987).
27 The Massachusetts chapter of the American College of Obstetricians and Gyne-
cologists asserted recently that since 1984 nearly one-fifth of the 428 Massachusetts ob-
stetricians who had responded to a survey sent to 635 Fellows had ceased practicing
obstetrics because of burdensome insurance costs and litigation. N.Y. Times, Jan. 17,
1988, § 1, at 38, col. 1. Compare N.Y. PILOT STUDY, supra note 2, at 11. See also id. at
121-122, noting that though an adverse verdict in a malpractice proceeding may have
"some impact upon professional reputation and practice" and may perhaps even cause
[Vol. 73:170
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Other deterrents. Though the efficacy of malpractice suits as pro-
ducers of care and competence may be debated, nobody doubts that
carelessness and incompetence must be deterred. If the fault sys-
tem, involving nonexpertjurors' judgments concerning responsibil-
ity for particular occurrences (often in the distant past), does not
adequately fulfill the need for deterrence, what should take its
place?
Years ago critics of the existing pattern of litigation argued that
imprisonment or civil monetary fines beyond the protection of a lia-
bility insurance policy would be more effective than tort law in shap-
ing behavior.28 Professional disciplinary action against health care
providers whose conduct had not measured up to expected stan-
dards would be yet more effective as a warning signal. It would de-
liver a message not only to those who were themselves being
disciplined and were thus being told to mend their ways, but would
an insurer to increase a physician's future insurance costs, doubt remains concerning the
efficacy of tort proceedings as "incentives to doctors and other providers to be more
careful in their course of treatment .... "
First, an ideal prevention system needs to make accurate judgments
about who really was at fault in particular incidents, and then to tailor its
sanctions to the degree of carelessness involved in different accidents.
Under the tort system, though, the initiation of a'suit and the assessment
of damages are dependent on the nature and level of the patient's injury
rather than upon the gravity of the doctor's negligence, and the judg-
ments about the latter are made by lay juries who may be prone to mis-
takes in appraising complicated forms of treatment with the benefit of
hindsight.
Id.
28 See, e.g., G. CALABRESI, supra note 19, at 269-70, 272:
whenever normal individuals can choose whether or not to engage in
wrongful conduct before an accident, an appropriate noninsurable pen-
alty is necessarily a more effective deterrent than an already paid insur-
ance premium.
.... Because the fault system, like the market system, must work pri-
marily through raising the costs to categories of individuals rather than
affecting the individual at the time of decision, it is necessarily as ineffec-
tive as the market system in dealing with such acts, and considerably less
effective than a system of penalties.
For a sophisticated analysis of the efficacy of the fault-liability system as a deterrent
and safety enhancer, see Pierce, Encouraging Safety: The Limits of Tort Law and Government
Regulation, 33 VAND. L. REV. 1281 (1980). Pierce argues that modem tort law ineffec-
tively deters accidents and poorly compensates victims, compensating only some of
those who are deserving, frequently undercompensating, and seldom compensating
promptly.
As to compensation, distinct from deterrence, see D. HARRIS, M. MACLEAN, H.
GENN, S. LLOYD-BosTocK, P. FENN, P. CORFIELD & Y. BRITrAN, COMPENSATION AND SUP-
PORT FOR ILLNESS AND INJURY (1984) [hereinafter D. HARRIS], ably (and discordantly)
reviewed by Abel, Book Review, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1003 (1985); Kornhauser, Book Re-
view, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1024 (1985); see also P. MUNCH [DANZON], COSTS AND BENEFITS
OF THE TORT SYSTEM IF VIEWED AS A COMPENSATION SYSTEM 71-90 (1977).
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also remind others of the professional discrediting that substandard
performances might bring.
Typically, hospitals maintain self-administered "quality assur-
ance programs" that provide opportunity to review the work of the
staff (including independent physicians who have been accorded the
privilege of admitting their patients). These programs have been
slackly administered in many institutions and have therefore been of
variable worth. Their mere existence has given no assurance that the
quality of attending physicians' work will be closely examined.29
The medical profession itself and state governments' adminis-
trative organs have sweeping power to restrict or even halt a miscre-
ant physician's career; but inadequate funding for staff and
investigatory resources, often coupled with indecisive leadership,
has made for scant use of the power. Still, judgments rendered by
bodies like these impress health professionals more profoundly than
do the verdicts of jurors who, when asked to determine whether
faulty conduct occurred in an event long past, may sometimes be
impressed by the sad state of the plaintiff in the case now before
them, without fully grasping the medical subtleties of the case that
was actually before the physician long ago. Moreover, an adverse
determination by a professional tribunal cannot be shrugged off; the
offender cannot simply pass it along to his insurance company.
A real question nevertheless arises about the efficacy of existing
disciplinary processes because, plainly, they do not commence of
themselves and those who are responsible for putting them into mo-
tion have sometimes themselves apparently been slow to move. As
a recent report to the New York State Commissioner of Health
declared:
Whatever its other deficiencies, the tort system does stimulate pa-
tients who have been injured by careless treatment to call to ac-
count the doctor or hospital in open court. The patient's lawyer
has a professional and financial incentive to do the best job possi-
ble of documenting the case against such negligent treatment.30
29 The American Association of Retired Persons has asserted that "the existence of
only 'paper' quality assurance programs has contributed significantly to the incidences
of malpractice." FEB. 1986 GAO REPORT, supra note 9, at 28.
30 N.Y. PILOT STUDY, supra note 2, at 124, 125. A research aim of the study is to
provide empirical testing of the view that external or internal systems for appraising the
work of medical personnel are dominated by fellow professionals who lack incentive to
initiate and conduct vigorous proceedings against allegedly negligent physicians "and
then to impose the types of sanctions or preventive measures which the pattern of be-
havior exhibited in the case might seem to demand." Id. at 124-25. In late 1985 the
Office of Inspector General (OIG) of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Serv-
ices studied state medical licensing boards. The OIG found that budgetary and person-
nel inadequacies had resulted in large backlogs of undecided cases and consequent lack
of enthusiasm for initiating yet more disciplinary proceedings. The OIG recommended
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Safety enhancement as the goal sought. In this area of human con-
cern, the goal to which law aspires (or, at any rate, should aspire) is
enhancing safety. That is to say, law should seek primarily to help
diminish the occurrence of injuries related to health care, rather
than be content with simply assigning blame, administering disci-
pline after the event, or providing compensation for accidents that
have already occurred. If fault-based tort remedies are, at best, only
spottily effective as enhancers of patients' safety and if noninsurable
penalties upon physicians and other providers of health services
have been mildly applied in the past,31 can administration of profes-
sional discipline be invigorated to accomplish its declared purpose
of injury prevention? Real possibility of an affirmative answer to that
question now exists.
Identification of unworthy physicians. The licensing and disciplining
of physicians are state functions. As in so many other areas of state
affairs, however, the national government can and does heavily in-
fluence the content and administration of state laws by financial in-
ducements, technical assistance, and educational programs.3 2 The
federal role has been enlarged by enactment of the Health Care
Quality Improvement Act of 1986,33 which, among other things,
comprehensively requires hospitals, state licensing boards, peer re-
view organizations, and other bodies involved in granting privileges
increased physician licensing fees to support expanded and improved disciplinary activi-
ties. HHS TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 5, at 63.
31 See HHS TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 5, at 65-66: Licensed physicians in 1985
numbered 552,716. In that year the licensing boards of the fifty states took 2,108 disci-
plinary actions (37 percent more than in 1984). They revoked 406 licenses and sus-
pended 235, they placed 491 physicians on probation, and they otherwise disciplined
976 for unacceptable behavior. The state boards proceeded informally in perhaps three
times as many cases; the informal actions included directing a licensee to "avoid per-
forming certain procedures which are beyond his competence, or to obtain further train-
ing." Id. at 65. Approximately half of the disciplinary actions formally taken related to
improper prescription of drugs, and a physician's personal drug or alcohol abuse ac-
counted for roughly a quarter of the total. The relatively small number of disciplinary
actions for incompetence may not fully reflect the number of proceedings launched on
that account "since boards may be using more easily proven violations such as drug use
or over-prescribing, which often coexist with incompetence, as the basis for their ac-
tions" when legally adequate evidence to prove incompetence is not readily at hand or
when lengthy proceedings can be avoided by relying on other issues. Id. at 66.
The legal profession's record in dealing with discreditable attorneys is not so glit-
tering as to warrant lawyers' casting the first stone. See, e.g., Weber, "Still in Good Stand-
ing". The Crisis in Attorney Discipline, A.B.A.J., Nov. 1, 1987, at 58.
32 One of the national government's informational undertakings that many regard
as having improved health care and lessened the occurrence of iatrogenic injuries (i.e.,
injuries caused by physician or surgeon) is the National Second Surgical Opinion Pro-
gram, which informs persons who may be facing elective surgery and encourages steps
to guard against improvident procedures.
33 Pub. L. No. 99-660, §§ 401-J32, 100 Stat. 3743, 3784-94 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A.
§§ 52, 11101-111 (West Supp. 1987)).
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to or imposing discipline upon physicians to report at least monthly
every adverse action taken. Further, every insurance provider
(whether a commercial enterprise or a mutual protection society)
must now report every settlement or judgment paid on a malprac-
tice claim, with the name of the affected practitioner, the name of
any hospital with which he may be linked, a description of the al-
leged acts or omissions, and the consequent injuries.34
The Department of Health and Human Services, which receives
these multitudinous reports and deposits them in a National Data
Bank, will be in a position to provide timely information about a
physician or other licensed health care practitioner upon the request
of state licensing boards, hospitals, and other health care entities
that "have entered (or may be entering) into an employment or affil-
iation relationship with the physician or practitioner or to which the
physician or practitioner has applied for clinical privileges or ap-
pointment to the medical staff."35 If suitable use is made of the Na-
tional Data Bank, this single step will greatly strengthen existing
means of preventing an individual who is under disciplinary re-
straint in one area from simply moving to another; licensure can
become better informed and more confident, and hospitals will be
far better able to avoid employing or having other professional rela-
tionships with physicians of questionable reliability.36
34 Id. §§ 421-25, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 11131-11135. Federal agencies themselves em-
ploy 21,500 full-time physicians and contract with several times that number. HHS
TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 5, at 78. The reporting requirements just described do
not apply to the federal government, but presumably the employing and contracting
agencies will voluntarily report to the National Data Bank (as most had to the Discipli-
nary Data Bank, described below) concerning actions affecting their personnel individu-
ally; and presumably, too, when they are considering candidates for employment, they
will draw on others' deposits of information in the data bank.
The Federation of State Medical Boards has long maintained a Physician Discipli-
nary Data Bank (DDB), which has been a useful tool. The DDB, however, was not so
comprehensive as the new national data bank; reports to it were voluntary, and hospitals
and insurance carriers were under no obligation to convey to the DDB the information
they possessed.
35 Health Care Quality Improvement Act § 427(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 11137(a).
36 Section 425(a)(1), 42 U.S.C.A. § 11135(a), imposes a duty on each hospital to
request information from the National Data Bank whenever a practitioner applies for
hospital staff privileges (courtesy or otherwise). Section 425(a)(2), 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 11135(b), requires each hospital biennially to request a report concerning all of its
staff members as well as any practitioners granted clinical privileges.
A 1985 Pennsylvania study revealed that one percent of the physicians in that state
had been responsible for 25 percent of paid claims. HHS TASK FORCE REPORT, supra
note 5, at 58. Of course this did not conclusively establish that each and every member
of that small group should be shunned ever afterward; still, were the past record known,
the need of close examination in the future would be clear. See also U.S. GEN. ACcoUNT-
ING OFFICE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: A FRAMEWORK FOR ACTION 14 (GAO/HRD-87-73,
May 1987) [hereinafter MAY 1987 GAO REPORT] (of 71,930 physicians involved in mal-
practice claims closed in 1984, at least 42 percent had previously been the objects of
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Another admirable step toward weeding out the unsuitable
practitioners-or, in some instances, simply constricting the profes-
sional activities in which they may engage-has been taken alto-
gether nongovernmentally by the American Medical Association
(AMA). The AMA's Physician Masterfile now contains verified data
concerning the education and specialty board certification (if any) of
every physician in the country. Disciplinary action reported to the
Federation of State Medical Boards' data bank is noted in the Physi-
cian Masterfile. Indeed, if a physician is known to have been disci-
plined in one state, the AMA takes it upon itself to inform the
appropriate authorities in every other state in which that individual
may also have been licensed. The AMA also notifies states of physi-
cians' deaths, because impostors have sometimes used the creden-
tials of deceased practitioners to gain entry into medical practice.3 7
The easier availability of relevant information concerning medi-
cal personnel will be of diminished value if the pertinent state agen-
cies and other review organizations are inadequately financed and
unsuitably staffed to utilize it.38 As to that, variations among the
states are likely, as has been true in respect of allocation of public
resources for many other socially desirable programs. Yet one may
reasonably hope and believe that the more populous states, those
with the largest corps of medical personnel and probably the largest
volume of controversy concerning the quality of medical perform-
ance, will be energetic in seeking to deter objectionable practices.
The New York experience. New York is an example. There, a newly
invigorated Office of Professional Medical Conduct (OPMC) is re-
sponsible for investigating all complaints of medical misconduct
and, when warranted, for filing formal charges that lead to a hearing
before a committee of the Board for Professional Medical Conduct
or, in urgent situations, to summary license suspension by the State
Commissioner of Health. 39 The OPMC's investigation unit has as
claims). As FEB. 1986 GAO REPORT, supra note 9, at 60-61, stresses, however, a health
care provider's competence cannot be determined by simply counting the number of
lawsuits that named her as defendant.
37 The above information is drawn from HHS TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 5, at
68, and from sources there cited.
38 A 1985 study found that although the powers of state medical licensing boards
had been enlarged in recent years, "budgetary, personiel, and productivity increases
have not kept pace with expanding workloads, and as a result large backlogs and exten-
sive caseloads have become commonplace," contributing to tardy disciplinary action in
some instances. HHS TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 5, at 63; see also OFFICE OF INSPEC-
TOR GENERAL, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, MEDICAL LICENSURE AND
DISCIPLINE, AN OVERVIEW ii, 12-18 (1986).
39 "Medical misconduct" is embracively defined by N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6509 (McKin-
ney 1985) and by N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS., tit. 8, §§ 29.1, 29.2, 29.4 (1987). The
Board for Professional Medical Conduct is established pursuant to N.Y. PUB. HEALTH
LAW § 230 (McKinney 1987). That same section provides the Health Commissioner's
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its objective the completion of investigation within six months of
receiving a complaint.
During 1986 the Office of Professional Medical Conduct acted
on its own initiative thirty-seven times and responded to approxi-
mately 2,500 complaints. Of these, 1,360 came from members of
the public or the news media, eighty-four were anonymous, and the
rest came from diverse sources including physicians and insurance
companies .40 The volume of complaints exceeded that of the imme-
diately preceding years by almost one-third, presumably not be-
cause the occasions to complain had increased so dramatically, but
because public awareness of and confidence in the available admin-
istrative process had mounted. The OPMC completed 2,740 inves-
tigations in 1986, approximately twice as many as in 1985 and eight
times as many as in 1982. It sent 301 cases, six times as many as in
1984 and more than double those in 1985, forward for formal pro-
ceedings. Of these, the board rendered decisions in 206 of 242
cases that came before it. Final revocations or surrenders of
licenses were ordered in ninety-two cases, triple the number in 1982
and double the number in 1985; less severe sanctions such as sus-
pensions for stated periods, censure and reprimand, and critical
findings noted on the licensee's record occurred in ninety-seven in-
stances, far above the levels of the years before. In addition, the
Health Commissioner summarily suspended fifteen licenses in 1986,
as against four in 1985 and two in 1984.4 1
Inquiry into the circumstances of the individual cases, however,
reveals again that seeking to eliminate the unfit among the mass of
licensees may involve issues other than the performance of medical
responsibilities alone. Of the 206 cases that were decided on the
basis of formal charges filed by the OPMC, eighty-three related to
power to suspend a license summarily. The Board, whose members are appointed by
the Health Commissioner with the Governor's approval, consisted of 124 physician
members and 32 lay members in 1987. "Hearing committees" have two physician mem-
bers and one lay member. Id. § 230(6).
40 Insurance companies in New York are required by N.Y. INS' LAw § 315 (McKin-
ney 1985) to report incidents of possible malpractice of which they are informed. In
1986, New York inaugurated an improved reporting and data recording system to fur-
ther facilitate OPMC's inquiries. Only 40 of the complaints received in 1986, however,
came from insurance companies, so the improved system had slight use.
In addition to complaints that may generate investigations, the OPMC has at hand a
mass of required quarterly reports from insurance companies concerning malpractice
claims against New York doctors, their disposition by judgment or settlement, and any
cancellation of medical liability insurance for reasons other than nonpayment of premi-
ums. These reports go to OPMC's Medical Malpractice Unit for analysis and aggrega-
tion, to be used mainly for future legislative or administrative policymaking rather than
for indications of need to investigate individuals.
41 The numbers given in the text and in the discussion that follows were provided
to the author by the New York State Department of Health.
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improper dispensation of drugs, twenty-six to Medi-
caid/Medicare/insurance fraud, one to dealing in counterfeit cur-
rency, three to falsification of records, three to income tax evasion,
and still others to variegated criminal offenses. Some of these-
such as drug dispensation, falsifying records, and participating in
fraudulent practices-in all likelihood touched upon the perform-
ance of professional duties as well as upon personal morality. The
specific charges, however, related to criminal behavior rather than
to medical responsibilities.
Thirty-two additional cases dealt with impairment, and nine
with fraudulently obtaining a medical diploma. State proceedings in
these instances undoubtedly reflected a desire to lessen the risk of
patients suffering injuries in the course of medical treatment.42
As for cases of types that might directly generate malpractice
claims by patients, twenty-seven related to negligent, incompetent,
or fraudulent practice, one to abetting an unlicensed person, one to
patient abandonment, and sixteen to sexual abuse.
The tone and energy of New York's activism may reflect the
personal qualities of the present Health Commissioner, Dr. David
Axelrod. He has indeed spurred improved administration and the
development of enlightened policy in many areas. Without refer-
ence to personalities, however, New York with its roughly 55,000
licensed doctors has begun doing what other states with smaller
medical populations can do also, if they choose.
Many states have enacted "shield laws" that, like New York's,
42 The New York State Medical Society has created a Physicians Committee to work
with the state authorities in seeking to rehabilitate a physician whose license has been
suspended (or voluntarily surrendered) because of alcohol, drug, or mental health
problems. After a treatment program has met with apparent success and a physician's
license has been restored, a monitoring program and probation continue for at least two
years. Monitoring involves not merely random testing, but also close supervision of the
licensee's medical practice as revealed by case records and direct observation. N.Y. PUB.
HEALTH LAW § 230(17)-(18) (McKinney 1987). And note HHS TASK FORCE REPORT,
supra note 5, at 70-71, remarking that "objectionable practices" may reflect impairment
rather than technical lacks:
Impairment, defined as 'the inability to practice medicine with rea-
sonable skill and safety to patients by reason of physical or mental illness,
including alcoholism or drug dependence,' can be a cause of substandard
performance and avoidable medical injury.
Whatever the exact number of impaired physicians, even a small
number is sufficient to warrant strong programs addressing the situation,
in view of their role as providers of care where less than full awareness
and good judgment may result in injury or death to the patient.
The close linkage between physicians' impairment and medical malpractice has been
effectively shown in an October 1987 report to New Jersey's governor and legislature,
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE STATE OF NEWJERSEY COMMISSION OF INVESTIGA-
TION ON IMPAIRED AND INCOMPETENT PHYSICIANS 8, 10-12, 33 (Oct. 1987).
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should encourage utilization of the state's disciplinary processes by
safeguarding informants against reprisals in the form of lawsuits for
defamation, conspiracy to restrain competition, 43 and other un-
pleasantries. 44 No longer should fear impede the flow of pertinent
information about unworthy practitioners. On the contrary, the
flow should increase when stimulated by mounting awareness that
information will in fact be put to sophisticated use rather than
smothered by "professional courtesy" or administrative lethargy.45
Even so, the "brotherhood of silence " within the medical profes-
sion itself has not yet been overcome.
New moves toward safety enhancement. Two other developments
can possibly advance the cause of patient safety more significantly
than can the threat of either tort actions or disciplinary proceedings
after harm has been done.
First, organizations of accredited specialists have progressively
developed guidelines and standards to enhance the quality of care
their members provide.
46
43 See Curran, Medical Peer Review of Physician Competence and Performance: Legal Immu-
nity and the Antitrust Laws, 316 NEw ENG. J. MED. 597 (1987).
44 Lawyers for doctors charged with misconduct are said occasionally to have si-
lenced complainants in the past by threatening to sue them. That kind of threat seems
empty now. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 230(11)(a) (McKinney 1987) imposes a duty on
medical societies and institutional officials to report "any information... which reason-
ably appears to show that a physician is guilty of professional misconduct," and "any
other person" may report confidentially and with assurance of immunity from lawsuits if
acting in good faith. The federal Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, Pub. L.
No. 99-660, §§ 401-432, 100 Stat. 3743, 3784 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 11101-11152-
94 (West Supp. 1987)) provides a nationwide shield, in order to encourage freer resort
to professional review actions. Section 411(a)(2), 42 U.S.C.A. 11111, provides in part
that "no person ... providing information to a professional review body regarding the
competence or professional conduct of a physician shall be held, by reason of having
provided such information, to be liable in damages under any law . . ." unless the in-
formant knew the information to be false. Protection of peer review processes by hospi-
tals and medical societies has also been much strengthened by the new statute. § § 411-
415, 431, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 11111-11115, 11151.
45 Energetic investigation of complaints must, however, be accompanied by pru-
dent awareness that the filing of a malpractice claim, settlement by payment of money,
or, even, evidence of a doctor's involvement in an isolated lamentable occurrence is not
in itself compelling evidence of professional unworthiness. See HHS TASK FORCE RE-
PORT, supra note 5, at 83. According to a 1986 survey, at least one malpractice claim had
been pressed against 64 percent of obstetricians/gynecologists, 50 percent of surgeons,
39 percent of radiologists, and 36 percent of anesthesiologists. MAY 1987 GAO REPORT,
supra note 36, at 16. For a discussion of advances in some fields from "relatively simple
procedures" to "complex procedures" with an "evolving technology" that may lead to
"a higher complication rate and many uncertain outcomes," see id. at 18. See also FEB.
1986 GAO REPORT, supra note 9, at 60-61 (recounting cautionary statements concerning
the inferences to be drawn from the fact that a physician has been the target of profes-
sional liability lawsuits).
46 The work of the American Society of Anesthesiologists, through its Committee
on Patient Safety and Risk Management, will serve as an example. Anesthetic mishaps
are not of high frequency, but when they do occur, the consequences may be grave. The
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Second, state licensing bodies have shown mounting interest in
periodically reexamining a physician's qualifications, instead of sim-
ply bestowing a lifetime license whose renewal at stated intervals is
an occasion for collecting a fee rather than for considering the licen-
see's merit. In 1987 a number of states required licensees to earn
"continuing medical education credits" in order to qualify for re-
newal of licensure;47 Massachusetts required its physicians to par-
ticipate in risk management programs and Florida required every
physician to complete at least five hours of risk management train-
ing every two years. 48 A few states even delved into records (such as
reports by hospitals concerning adverse privileging actions) before a
license could be extended.49 Breaking new ground, New York
in mid-1987 resolved to be the first state to undertake a substantial
reexamination of a medical licensee's competence at stated
intervals.
50
In sum, lawsuits that seek to fix blame for adverse events re-
lated to medical treatment are not now, if ever they were, the sole
means available in the United States for deterring misconduct and
encouraging conscientious, effective discharge of professional
responsibilities.
Society has forced its members to become aware of technical advances, equipment de-
velopments, protective devices, and monitoring procedures in their field of work, inside
and outside the operating room itself. In 1986 the Society adopted Minimal Standards
for Anesthesia, based on those prepared by the anesthesiologists in the several Harvard
hospitals. See Eichhorn, Cooper & Cullen, Standards for Patient Monitoring During Anesthe-
sia at Harvard Medical School, 256J. A.M.A. 1017 (1986). The Society's related Anesthe-
sia Patient Safety Foundation is devoted to developing information concerning causes
and prevention of anesthetic injuries. Anesthesiologists are still engaged in a risky activ-
ity, but the preventive campaigns have made considerable headway in lessening the
risks. This is evidenced in part by claims statistics. The frequency of claims against
anesthesiologists in 1979 had been 39 percent higher than the average for all physicians.
By 1985 that figure had declined to 4.7 percent. Wood, Anesthesia Claim Decrease: Number
Rises More Slowly But Severity Remains High, 1 ANESTHESIA PATIENT SAFETY FOUND. NEWSL.
21 (1986).
47 HHS TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 5, at 61-62.
48 MAY 1987 GAO REPORT, supra note 36, at 17.
49 HHS TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 5, at 61-62; MAY 1987 GAO REPORT, supra
note 36, at 17.
50 N.Y. Times, June 28, 1987, at A29, col. 1. The New York review would extend
to all licensees, whether or not they have hospital affiliations. The state's reexamination
of professional fitness would supplement the activities of the national specialty boards
(fifteen of the twenty-three now in existence) that already require certified specialists to
undergo some measure of periodic review of competence in order to retain their board
certification. The New York State Advisory Committee on Physician Credentialing, cre-
ated at the Governor's request and chaired by designees of the Health Commissioner
and the Chancellor of the Board of Regents, suggested in a February 1988 report that
physicians should have to renew their licenses every nine years by taking an examina-
tion, undergoing review by other physicians, or by an evaluation of patient records.
N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1988, at Al, col. 1.
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II
MEDICAL MISADVENTURE IN NEW ZEALAND
In 1974 New Zealand, a country that shares "the common law
tradition," ceased relying on medical malpractice litigation as a
means of achieving social well-being. Instead it provided by law for
compensating "persons who suffer personal injury by accident" (and some
of their dependents if death results); it also provided that "no pro-
ceedings for damages arising directly or indirectly out of the injury
or death shall be brought in any court in New Zealand indepen-
dently of this Act .... whether under any rule of law or any enact-
ment." 51 "Personal injury by accident" includes:
(i) The physical and mental consequences of any such injury or
of the accident;
(ii) Medical, surgical, dental, or first aid misadventure.
52
A brief examination of the operation of the New Zealand no-
fault system may be useful for the United States despite great dis-
parities between the two countries. New Zealand's 3.3 million pop-
ulation and its land mass are approximately those of Colorado.
These objective facts argue against supposing that what works well
in New Zealand will assuredly be successful also in the much larger
and more populous United States. They do not, however, argue
against being closely observant of New Zealand's having replaced
long accepted legal concepts and methods. Mr. Justice Brandeis,
commenting fifty-five years ago on state governments' experiments
in remolding existing economic practices to meet changing societal
needs, remarked: "It is one of the happy incidents of the federal
system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose,
serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experi-
ments without risk to the rest of the country." 53 So, too, the out-
come of an experiment courageously launched by a single small
nation, whose traditions and policies are closely akin to this coun-
try's, may substantially affect American policy choices for the future.
The meaning of "medical misadventure." A medical (or other health
care) "misadventure" is not itself defined in the Accident Compen-
sation Act. The Act simply includes it as a species of the accidental
injuries for which the Act provides relief. In general, a "personal
injury by accident" occurs when a human being's system is damaged
51 Accident Compensation Act §§ 26-27, [1982] 3 N.Z. Stat. 1552, 1577-79. The
1982 statute is in the main a codification of the initial Accident Compensation Law of
1972 (which came into force in 1974) and numerous later amendments that affected
details and administration, without modifying the underlying philosophy.
52 Id. § 2, [1982] 3 N.Z. Stat. at 1560.




unexpectedly, without design by the person injured, by a cause
other than disease or the aging process. The element of unexpect-
edness connotes, as a generality, a certain measure of suddenness, a
specific event as distinct from the consequences of a general deteri-
oration of the body over a long period of time. Thus, a person who,
while at work, experienced a fatal heart attack because of high blood
pressure would not have suffered injury by accident unless the car-
diovascular episode were shown to be immediately related to an
identifiable and, for that person, an unusual stress or strain.54
As the years have passed, the term "medical misadventure" has
gained meaning through repeated application. Plainly enough, it in-
cludes negligent or otherwise wrongful conduct. It goes farther,
however, for it also connotes mishaps that come about with no ele-
ment of fault.55 The question the system asks is not whether a per-
son is suffering the consequences of blameworthy medical conduct,
but, rather, whether medical causation of a person's injury is
established.
Initial judicial hesitancy to read "misadventure" expansively
aroused vigorous criticism in informed quarters.5 6 Until fairly re-
cently New Zealand courts tended to think of a mishap as a trau-
matic event. They were wary of regarding diagnostic inadequacies
as misadventures. Some of the judges deemed patients in those sit-
uations not to have suffered a mishap, but simply to have suffered
the consequences of an underlying disease or bodily condition that
had been neither caused nor altered by medical activity. Some
judges at first did not consider unsatisfactory outcomes of medical
treatment to be misadventures. For example, when prudently pre-
scribed and faultlessly performed surgical procedures, anesthetic
methods, or drug administrations were known to entail a risk
(though it be slim) of adverse results, a patient unfortunate enough
to leave the operating room in far less happy condition than when
54 Definitional discussion is found in J. FAHY, ACCIDENT COMPENSATION COVERAGE
20-28 (8th ed. 1984); and compare T. ISON, ACCIDENT COMPENSATION 23-29 (1980). In-
terestingly, the New Zealand statute was criticized in some American quarters for not
having gone far enough, rather than for being revolutionary. See, e.g., Henderson, The
New ZealandAccident Compensation Reform, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 781, 792 (1981) ("there is no
reason why victims of misfortunes other than accidents should not have equally valid
claims to compensation as accident victims").
55 See J. FAHY, supra note 54, at 22-24, in part referring to the case Application for
Review by E, [1983] N.Z.A.C.R. 650, a High Court decision that "medical misadven-
ture" occurs when a person who is receiving medical care or attention suffers bodily or
mental injury or damage "caused by mischance or accident, unexpected and unde-
signed, in the nature of medical error or medical mishap." J. FAHY, supra, note 54, at 23 (em-
phasis added).
56 See, e.g., Palmer, Accident Compensation in New Zealand: The First Two Years, 25 AM.J.
CoMP. L. 1, 38-39 (1977).
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she had entered might be regarded not as the victim of a mischance,
but only as the loser of a gamble that a particular result would be
happily achieved in her case as in the generality.
More recently, the current has run toward recognizing that the
person whose bodily condition is worsened rather than bettered by
medical treatment has indeed suffered an injury caused by an unex-
pected, undesigned mischance even when medical science had fore-
told the possibility of worsening. Some of the decisions have
somewhat timidly tiptoed into the "informed consent" area; a pa-
tient who was not told or was misinformed about the element of risk
might be said to have encountered an unexpected accident if the
risk became a reality.5 7 Other cases have regarded the remoteness
of the risk of a grave, undesired result as a factor to be weighed,
whether or not the existence of risk had been disclosed before treat-
ment was undertaken. A patient who, after being told that an opera-
tion to relieve back pain entailed a one-in-a-hundred chance of her
becoming a paraplegic, nevertheless submits to the operation and,
alas, then discovers she is the one, is indeed suffering from bad for-
tune, that is, "misadventure.
' 5 8
As yet, no clear measurement of "remoteness" has been pro-
vided by the New Zealand courts. Plainly enough the judges are
aware that all medical treatment, no matter how well considered and
executed, is inherently risky in that it may not succeed in producing
the desired result, but they wish, as a critic has said, " 'to avoid slid-
57 See, e.g., Knox v. Accident Compensation Corp., No. 149/86 (Accident Compen-
sation Appeal Auth. Oct. 21, 1986) (a surgical procedure to sterilize claimant was prop-
erly performed, but unsuccessful; claimant, who had not been warned to avoid sexual
intercourse until later tests showed successful outcome, became pregnant; held, claim for
medical misadventure had been established); see also Mahoney, Informed Consent and
Breach of the Medical Contract to Achieve a Particular Result: Opportunities for New Zealand's
Latent Personal Injury Litigators to Peek Out of the Accident Compensation Closet, 6 OTAGO L.
REV. 103 (1985); Osborne, Informed Consent to Medical Treatment and the Accident Compensa-
tion Act 1972, 1979 N.Z.L.J. 198. But cf. Re Priestly, [1984] N.Z.A.C.R. 787 (doctor under
no duty to inform patient of risks of failure sterilization unless patient asked).
58 See, e.g., MacDonald v. Accident Compensation Corp., [1985] 5 N.Z.A.R. 276. In
that case a properly performed abdominal operation led to the patient's suffering a leaky
bowel. The possibility of this consequence was known, but the risk was considered to be
a bit less than one percent. The disproportion between the predictable danger and the
operation's actual results heavily influenced the conclusion that things had "turned out
badly" for the patient and that this constituted misadventure. See also Viggars v. Acci-
dent Compensation Corp., [1986] 6 N.Z.A.R. 235: A patient suffered a stroke while a
carotid arteriogram was being performed to assess the condition of his arteries. This
was known to be a possible though highly unlikely outcome of this type of operation.
The unhappy consequence of the operation in this instance "was so unusual and un-
likely that it could properly be described as mischance or bad fortune," id. at 239, and
"clearly not within the normal range of medical or surgical failure attendant upon an
arteriogram," id. at 240-and "it accords with the natural and ordinary meaning of the
words" that the sufferer had indeed experienced a "medical misadventure." Id.
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ing down the slippery slope and compensating illness or death every
time medical treatment fails.' "59
A treatment's failure to improve the patient's health is far dif-
ferent, however, from a treatment's creating a new distress. As to
the latter kind of post-treatment misfortune, why should it matter
that a form of medical treatment is known to have a tiny or, even, a
substantial element of risk that the patient may suffer a new distress
(rather than a betterment or a continuation of the status quo)? If
the misfortune does occur, the patient has in fact been injured.
What is more, the injury, though known to be possible, was unex-
pected, for nobody would direct and nobody would submit to a
treatment that was actually expected to accomplish a distressing re-
sult. The injury was undesigned, that is to say, not planned to hap-
pen; it was the outcome of an identifiable event, the treatment.
Most nonmedical accidents that give rise to compensation for
personal injuries in New Zealand, as in the United States, undoubt-
edly stem from activities in which risk of injury inheres. One indig-
nant legal scholar writes:
Merely because there is a known chance that can be quantified in
statistical terms that a daily automobile commuter will suffer a
personal injury through a motor vehicle collision does not make
the disaster, when it occurs, any less of an "accident" or a "misad-
venture". That a known risk has the effect of turning an accident
into some undefined "something else" solely in the medical field
is anomalous and unfair.60
In all probability courts will perceive the soundness of this view. If
they do not, or if the parliament does not then strengthen the pres-
ent protection against injuries occasioned by medical treatment, one
may predict a partial revival of personal injury litigation with heavy
reliance on the doctrine of informed consent or a spate of contrac-
tual disputes concerning a medical practitioner's failure to produce
59 REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON CIVIL LIABILITY AND COMPENSATION FOR
PERSONAL INJURY 288 (1978) (testimony of Geoffrey Palmer), quoted in Mahoney, supra
note 57, at 109; see also Accident Compensation Auckland Hospital Bd., [1986] 2
N.Z.L.R. 748, 751: "All treatment, whether medical or surgical, has a chance of being
unsuccessful. There is an expected failure rate in all these matters and such failure may
be because no matter how correct the treatment, nature does not always respond in the
desired way. It would be quite beyond the intention or wording of the Accident Com-
pensation Act that cover should be granted on the basis of personal injury by accident
because medical treatment was not 100%o effective. Certainty cannot be underwritten."
In the United States, as in New Zealand, an unsuccessful outcome does not in itself
show that a patient suffered at the hands of her doctor. If the patient seeks compensa-
tion, she must show that her physician's act or failure to act deprived her of an opportu-
nity to recover or significantly enlarged the risk of an undesired outcome. See
Annotation, Medical Malpractice-"Loss of Chance" Causality, 54 A.L.R.4th 10, 17 (1987).
60 Mahoney, supra note 57, at 108.
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the results of which he had assured the patient.6 1
From the standpoint of New Zealand's medical profession,
loosely interpreting and liberally applying "medical misadventure"
are advantageous because the Accident Compensation Act bars law-
suits for damages "arising directly or indirectly" from a personal
injury by accident-and the Accident Compensation Corporation's
decision as to whether a person has in fact "suffered personal injury
by accident" is conclusive. 62 Hence New Zealand physicians will be
protected rather than harmed if the courts unequivocally conclude
that an injurious outcome of treatment, even though lying within
the known range of risk and not at all the product of anybody's fault,
is within the statutory scope of "medical misadventure."
The issue is perhaps not of major moment because, without ref-
erence to misadventure, section 2(1) of the Act defines "personal
injury by accident" as including, among other things, "[the physical
and mental consequences of any such injury or of the accident."
63
Where a person sought medical attention because he was injured by
what is indisputably an accident (for example, an automobile colli-
sion or a machinery malfunction in a factory), the effect of the medi-
cal treatment upon the already injured person is assuredly among
"the physical and mental consequences" of the accident or the in-
jury. Whether or not the outcome of a physician's efforts might
have been deemed to be "medical misadventure" had the claimant-
patient been previously uninjured, the medical treatment's results
(be they benign or adverse) in a case of this nature must be taken
fully into account when the Accident Compensation Corporation
determines entitlement to compensation. Hence cases explicitly
turning on the occurrence of medical misadventure are numerically
61 Mahoney reports that "a few of such claims" were actually in "various stages of
litigation" in early 1985, though the present writer found no awareness of them in early
1987. Id. at 124 n.21; see also Osborne, The Duty to Disclose Risks of Medical Treatment in New
Zealand, 12 N.Z. RECENT LAw (n.s.) 66, 71 (1986) (asserting that "the common law action
for failure to disclose risks of medical treatment is at least in some form alive in New
Zealand and it promises to be an important and interesting addendum to the Accident
Compensation Scheme"); cf. Bowden & Hodson, The Search for the Middle Ground: Medical
Misadventure and Surgical Risk, 99 N.Z. MED.J. 628 (1986) (advising doctors before under-
taking to render a medical service of uncertain efficacy to obtain their patient's informed
consent).
Compare Hellner, Compensation for Personal Injury: The Swedish Alternative, 34 AM. J.
COMP. L. 613, 629 (1986):
A special question.., is whether lack of information and informed con-
sent should be considered a sufficient ground for protection. In my opin-
ion it is not. It is probably rare that information about risks will in fact
influence a patient's decision about the treatment that he will accept; he
will rely on the advice given to him, whether or not he knows of the risks.
62 Accident Compensation Act § 27(1) & (3), [1982 3 N.Z. Stat. 1552, 1578.
63 Id. § 2(1)(a)(i), [1982] 3 N.Z. Stat. at 1560.
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insignificant. What might otherwise have been contested episodes
have more often than not become inconspicuous elements of plainly
compensable injuries. 64
Financing, cost, and benefits. The social insurance system just
sketched is financed by levies on employers, self-employed persons,
and owners of motor vehicles, and also by public monies. 65 The
total expenditure is considerable for a small country. Yet, despite
greatly broadened assurance that injured persons will be compen-
sated without having to prove somebody else's fault, the costs seem
bearable.66 Motorists no longer need insure against liability for
causing personal injuries, employers no longer need pay for work-
ers' compensation insurance, self-employed persons no longer need
pay for protection against total interruption of earnings because of
incapacitating injury, and at least the more affluent among the coun-
try's taxpayers, including medical personnel, no longer need buy as
much liability insurance as once they did. Moreover, and most sig-
nificant of all, only about ten percent of the Accident Compensation
Corporation's funds are expended for administrative purposes, the
balance being paid out to or on behalf of persons injured by acci-
dents. 67 Because the Accident Compensation Corporation has re-
64 Table 2 of 4 ACCIDENT COMPENSATION CORP., ACC STATISTICS 4 (1985) shows
that of the 117,436 accidental injuries in 1983 which led to compensation by the ACC,
2,035 happened in hospitals. In that same year only 91 injuries resulting from accidents
explicitly characterized as medical misadventures were compensated. Id. at 19 table 5.
65 T. ISON, supra note 54, at 122-27.
66 The Accident Compensation Corporation's compensation payments to claimants
have grown markedly during the past several years, apparently reflecting mounting pub-
lic awareness of the availability of compensation for even short term, minor injuries.
The Law Commission proposed that the present waiting period of one week before com-
pensation become payable be extended to a two-week waiting period; this "would re-
move a large number of minor injuries from the scheme, removing some financial
pressure from the funding, and enabling the Corporation to concentrate on major disa-
bilities and simplifying its administration." NEW ZEALAND LAW COMMISSION, THE Acci-
DENT COMPENSATION SCHEME 13 (Rep. No. 3, 1987).
67 REPORT OF THE ACCIDENT COMPENSATION CORPORATION 11 (1987) shows the
following:
1983/84 89 cents/S 1.00 to injured person
1984/85 90 cents/$1.00 to injured person
1985/86 91 cents/$1.00 to injured person
1986/87 93 cents/$1.00 to injured person
The Corporation's operating costs include the expenditures for rehabilitation of injured
persons, as well as the costs of accident prevention. (Here as elsewhere in this paper
dollar amounts refer to New Zealand dollars rather than to the American variety. When
this was written, a $N.Z. could be bought by 60-odd cents U.S. In terms of purchasing
power within New Zealand, however, a SN.Z. seemed to this writer in 1987 to be fully
the equivalent of a $U.S.)
The actuality appears to be far different from what was predicted some years ago.
In 1976 a scholar asserted that treating medical causation rather than medical negli-
gence as the central issue would probably have a disappointing administrative effect
upon "transaction costs." Epstein, Medical Malpractice: The Case for Contract, 76 Am. B.
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jected only a tiny percentage of the approximately 150,000
compensation claims received annually, judicial review proceedings
have been few. 6
8
The level of benefits in New Zealand is far lower than the more
exuberant jury awards in American malpractice litigation. An in-
jured person who receives earnings related compensation (i.e., an
individual who is self-employed or employed by another) is paid for
loss of earnings while disabled equal to eighty percent of normal
earnings (including overtime), periodically adjusted to reflect cost-
of-living increases.69 An injured nonearner, having lost no earn-
ings, clearly is unentitled to compensation on that account.
Whether or not an earner, however, every person injured by acci-
dent does receive the cost of medical attention, rehabilitation and
related equipment, expenses of remodeling the dwelling place or
motor vehicle if the injury has necessitated structural changes, and
payment for necessary care in the home or elsewhere if the injured
person requires constant personal attention because of the injury.70
Moreover, to a person whose accidental injury involves the perma-
nent loss or impairment of any bodily function (for example, loss of
an arm or a toe, total blindness, or deafness in one ear), a lump sum
payment not to exceed $17,000 is made without reference to the
sufferer's status as earner or nonearner. 71 Finally, again without dif-
ferentiating between earners and nonearners, the statute provides
that the Accident Compensation Corporation may pay the injured
person "a lump sum of such amount (if any) as the Corporation
thinks fit but not exceeding $10,000 in respect of
(a) The loss ... of amenities or capacity for enjoying life, includ-
ing loss from disfigurement; and
(b) Pain and mental suffering, including nervous shock and
neurosis.72
The statute adjures the Corporation to "have regard to the person's
FOUND. RES. J. 87, 148 (1976). Professor Epstein avowed the opinion that "we need in
the context of medical malpractice less government, and not more government; we need
greater respect for private initiative and control..." Id. at 95; see also P. DANZON, supra
note 25, at 216-17: "The program costs of a comprehensive no-fault system of compen-
sation for iatrogenic injury could indeed be staggering.... The proponents of no-fault
plans hope to offset these additional costs by savings from three sources: reduced litiga-
tion per case, scheduled awards in place of unlimited, individualized tort awards, and
offset of collateral benefits." The author doubted that the hoped for savings would be
realized; but, at least thus far, they have in fact been substantial in New Zealand.
68 T. ISON, supra note 54, at 122.
69 Accident Compensation Act § 52, [1982) 3 N.Z. Stat. 1552, 1606-10.
70 Id. §§ 72, 75, 78, 80, [1982] 3 N.Z. Stat. at 1642-44, 1645-49, 1650-52, 1654-56.
71 Id. § 78, [1982] 3 N.Z. Stat. at 1650-52.
72 Id. § 79, [1982] 3 N.Z. Stat. at 1652-54.
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knowledge and awareness of his injury and loss." 7 3
In short, the financial aspect of New Zealand's substitute for
medical malpractice litigation precludes anyone's hoping to "hit the
jackpot" or to "win the lottery" as in the United States. A New Zea-
lander who has suffered a medical mishap cannot, as can an Ameri-
can, commence a lengthy contest that may or may not lead to
recovering substantial sums (from which, in any event, lawyers' fees
and other expenses must be deducted). At the most a New Zealander
can expect an easily accessible administrative process with right of
appeal to the courts if the outcome is unsatisfactory (and in most
instances the claimant is paid his costs, regardless of outcome), a
fairly speedy award of a steady income related to past earnings, a
payment of no more than $10,000 for pain and suffering and loss of
amenities, another payment not to exceed $17,000 for bodily im-
pairment that may not relate at all to past or future earnings, medi-
cal attention as needed, and financial help in adjusting to changed
circumstances.
The other big difference between America's fault-based system
and New Zealand's social insurance system is that fewer than half of
those who seek compensation in the United States for injuries they
attribute to malpractice receive any compensation whatever, and
most persons who might be regarded as potential claimants do not
even begin the contest. In New Zealand, by contrast, persons in-
jured by accident can and do file claims freely without becoming
entangled in expense or in the heat-engendering issue of blamewor-
thiness, and most of the claims are acted upon favorably.
In New Zealand, assurance of compensation in a reasonably
predictable amount seems to be preferred to taking one's chances
on recovery of unexpected riches in an amount determined by sub-
jective sentiment.74 Avoidance of the adversary atmosphere that in-
73 Id., [1982] 3 N.Z. Stat. at 1652-54.
74 Damages for pain and suffering and punitive damages are particularly suscepti-
ble to determination by "subjective sentiment." Physical or emotional pain and suffer-
ing "have no measurable dimensions, mathematical or financial. Courts [in the United
States] have ... , therefore, relied upon the collective judgment ofjuries to quantify
such injuries." Ingber, Rethinking Intangible Injuries: A Focus on Remedy, 73 CALIF. L. REv.
772, 778 (1985); see also P. CANE, ATIYAH'S ACCIDENTS, COMPENSATION AND THE LAW 183-
87 (4th ed. 1987) (discussing difficulties and inconsistencies in assessing intangible inju-
ries). Sometimes what is found to be acceptable as ajury's "collective judgment" seems
rather extreme. See, e.g., Tetuan v. A.H. Robins Co., 241 Kan. 441, 738 P.2d 1210
(1987) (upholding, after seven years of litigation, an award of $9.2 million to a woman
who suffered an infection caused by an intrauterine device and as a consequence under-
went a total hysterectomy).
But cf Johnston, Punitive Liability: A New Paradigm of Efficiency in Tort Law, 87 COLUM.
L. REV. 1385 (1987) (advocating the notion of "optimal punitive liability" as a more
efficient principle of liability than those currently used in tort law). Statutory curbs on
punitive damage awards have tended to be related to specific types of cases, rather than
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evitably accompanies litigation concerning malpractice or other
torts involving allegations of highly personalized fault seems to be
widely regarded as a social gain. During three months of intensive
(though not scientifically structured) interviewing throughout New
Zealand in 1987, this writer found no hint of desire, in any element
of the population, to return to the good old days of the fault system
and malpractice lawsuits. Nobody voiced concern about a diminu-
tion of retributive justice or about disregarding the "fairness" or
"morality" of making injurers pay the bills-supposedly among the
chief justifications of continued malpractice litigation in the United
States. The right to be compensated seems to have been accepted
as fulfilling emotional as well as economic needs. 75 These impres-
sions were confirmed in mid-1987 by a careful nationwide opinion
poll of 2,500 persons, eighty percent of whom supported the pres-
ent accident compensation scheme, though some favored redistri-
bution of some of its costs.
76
Injury prevention. The New Zealand Accident Compensation Act
states as its purposes: (1) promoting safety, (2) advancing the reha-
bilitation of persons who, despite efforts to increase safety, are nev-
comprehensive. See, e.g., Act of July 22, 1987, ch. 197, § 5, 1987 N.J. Sess. Law Serv.
188, 191 (West) (limiting punitive damages in products liability actions to only those
cases where claimant receives compensatory damages and proves by preponderance of
evidence that harm was caused with actual malice or willful disregard); Labaton, Cut in
Punitive Awards Sought, N.Y. Times, Oct. 12, 1987, § D, at 2, col. 1 (discussing isolated
cases of punitive damages awards and attempts by some state legislatures to limit them).
But see M. SHANLEY & M. PETERSON, PoSTTRIAL ADJUSTMENTS TO JURY AWARDS (RAND R-
351 l-ICJ, 1987) (showing that original jury awards have been substantially reduced by
judges or by the parties' agreement, and that reductions are particularly marked when
juries have awarded large sums as punitive damages); see also M. PETERSON, S. SARMA &
M. SHANLEY, PUNrrIvE DAMAGES (1987) (surveying the results of 68 punitive damages
awards in California and Illinois and finding that plaintiffs received only about half the
amount of the juries' awards). As to conscientious jurors' difficulty in dealing with com-
plex medical testimony and in following judges' instructions, seeJuries on Trial. Are They
"Out of Control"?, 11 RAND RES. REV. 1 (1987), and M. SELVIN & L. Picus, THE DEBATE
OVER JURY PERFORMANCE 61 (1987).
75 Cf Keeton, Is There a Place for Negligence in Modern Tort Law?, 53 VA. L. REV. 886,
889 (1967):
To what extent is appeasement accomplished because rights to com-
pensation are based on negligence rather than merely because they are
recognized as enforceable rights? For example, would appeasement of
the innocent victim of a negligent driver be any less effective if the victim
were entitled to the same compensation but on a basis of strict liability, or
on a basis of loss insurance? As with the question whether a community
sense ofjustice demands that negligent actors compensate innocent vic-
tims, here again no answer can be proved correct. Instead we must spec-
ulate, and perhaps the more persuasive speculation is that merely
recognizing a right to compensation does far more to appease the of-
fended than basing that right on negligence ....
76 See NEW ZEALAND LAW COMMISSION, THE ACCIDENT COMPENSATION SCHEME 3
(Prelim. Paper No. 2, 1987).
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ertheless injured by accident, and (3) providing for compensation of
those who do suffer the consequences of accidental injuries to the
person.7 7 The emphasis has been reversed in administrative reality.
Attention is given primarily to the compensatory aspects of the stat-
utory scheme; rehabilitation is chiefly of interest because, when suc-
cessful, it terminates or at least reduces payments to persons who
have been injured; and preventive activities, looking toward en-
hanced safety, are less vigorously pursued than the Accident Com-
pensation Corporation's other major tasks.
The Corporation's safety officers have not, let it be said, been
idle or altogether ineffective. On the contrary, their efforts to edu-
cate the public about hazards have often been notably successful; a
visitor is struck by the extent to which workers, householders, ath-
letes, and children have become accustomed to using protective de-
vices such as headgear, breathing filters in dusty or fume-laden
environments, and "ear muffs" to reduce the impact of noise. Some-
times successful, too, have been gentle proddings of employers
whose businesses have been marked by high accident rates. The
Corporation has made efforts to persuade managers that an injury
to a worker is often coupled with injury to a machine or to costly
interference with production work. As a general policy, however,
the Corporation has sought to avoid confrontations and disciplinary
measures as means of driving home the lessons safety officers have
tried to teach.78
Proceedings against doctors. This no doubt carefully considered
disinclination to "get tough" is especially manifest in relation to
health care providers. Medical practitioners, who are not in abun-
dant supply in many parts of New Zealand, are integral elements of
the administrative machinery that makes the Accident Compensa-
tion Act operable. The Accident Compensation Corporation needs
77 Accident Compensation Act, § 26, [1982] 3 N.Z. Stat. 1552, 1577-78.
78 Section 40(2)(a), [1982] 3 N.Z. Stat. at 1594, authorizes the ACC to impose "a
penalty of such amount as it thinks fit" (up to 100 percent of the annual levy) on an
employer or self-employed person whose "accident experience" is disquieting when
compared with that of others in the same type of business. Section 49(d), [1982] 3 N.Z.
Stat. at 1604, permits the ACC to impose "penalty rates of annual levies to be paid by
drivers and classes of drivers whose driving or accident record is significantly worse than
average." Neither section has thus far played a role in administration of the compensa-
tion system. For comparative purposes, the following sampling of information culled
from official United States sources is provided concerning the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration's exercise of power to levy penalties for record-keeping and
other safety violations: 9/16/86 Union Carbide $1,377,700; 12/23/86 Shell Oil
$244,000; 1/30/87 Chrysler Corp. $295,332; 4/25/87 John Morrell $690,000. Obvi-
ously, these are among the more dramatic examples; but many other cases involved
sums substantial enough to assure their being noticed by top management. In late 1987
the ACC began considering whether it should seek a similar capability to penalize disre-
gard of safety measures.
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them as aides, not as adversaries. In some parts of the country, dis-
qualifying one or two doctors might impair the Corporation's
functioning.
79
A claim for accidental injury must at the very outset be sup-
ported by a certificate from a general practitioner concerning the
nature of the injury. 80 The claimant's general practitioner also cer-
tifies the extent and duration of disability. 8 1 The general practi-
tioner's prescription of pharmaceuticals or of nonmedical or quasi-
medical treatments-physiotherapy, acupuncture, chiropractic, and
whatnot-is a precondition of the Corporation's paying the bills.
82
Referral of the patient to a specialist is initially in the general practi-
tioner's discretion, and the general practitioner chooses which spe-
cialist is most likely to fit the patient's needs and tastes.
As for the specialists, they do more than merely render their
specialized services to the patients who come to them through the
general practitioner channel. They also expertly appraise the pres-
ent and future condition of claimants whom the Accident Compen-
sation Corporation has referred to them. This occurs when doubts
have arisen concerning, for example, continuing entitlement to
compensation or the precise extent to which bodily malfunctioning
is likely to be permanent.
Relations between the Accident Compensation Corporation
and the medical profession and related health care providers have
not been constantly amiable. The Corporation pays doctors' bills,
but only to the extent it "considers that the amount to be paid by it
is reasonable by New Zealand standards." 83 Predictably, wrangling
has occurred concerning what is "reasonable" and which of various
"New Zealand standards" should be used as measurements.
84
79 In mid-1987, registered medical practitioners in New Zealand totaled over
8,000-1,886 "specialists" and 6,406 "general practitioners"-in widely scattered local-
ities. Uneven distribution of medical resources gives rise to problems in the United
States as well as in New Zealand. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, June 20, 1987, at 33, col. 1: A
statewide quality assurance committee, designated by the federal government to moni-
tor medical care given to Medicare patients in Texas, disqualified some small town doc-
tors for having "grossly and flagrantly" violated professional standards of care, citing
five elderly Texans who had died as a result. Far from earning tumultuous applause, this
led to widespread complaints, echoed in Congress, that elderly persons in rural areas
were being deprived of their doctors by overzealous review panels.
80 Accident Compensation Act § 75, [1982] 3 N.Z. Stat. 1552, 1645-49.
81 Id. §§ 78, 80, [1982] 3 N.Z. Stat. at 1650-52, 1654-56.
82 Id., [1982] 3 N.Z. Stat. at 1650-52, 1654-56.
83 Id. § 75(b), [1982] 3 N.Z. Stat. at 1645.
84 The Corporation has recently been sued in the High Court for not fulfilling its
statutory duty when, instead of paying fees of health care providers and hospitals almost
unquestioningly, it fixed "annotation lines" whereby fees up to a certain amount were
paid readily, but any fee above the line had to be specially justified. See The Dominion
(Wellington), Dec. 1, 1987, at 10, col. 7.
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Apart from economic friction, the "guild spirit" within the medical
profession appears to an outsider to be even stronger in New Zea-
land than in the United States, where sometimes extensive public
regulation of the practice of medicine has become familiar (though
not always greeted with cheers). Hostile reactions have discouraged
the Corporation's attempts to apply sanctions against physicians
whose reports have rather blatantly distorted the reality of claim-
ants' medical conditions. Medical societies have seemingly re-
garded discipline as their province. Other would-be disciplinarians
have sometimes been viewed as "doctor bashers" rather than as
protectors of the public (and of the medical profession itself) against
incompetence, impairment, carelessness, or dishonesty.
8 5
A senior official, agreeing in principle that professional protec-
tionism has made for a certain flabbiness in dealing with complaints
against providers of health care, has expressed belief that the Acci-
dent Compensation Corporation's proposing more efficient and
perhaps sterner measures would probably worsen the Corporation's
"already shaky relationship" with the medical community. When
conferring throughout New Zealand, this writer was struck by the
frequency of officials' conversational references to doctors whose
honesty or whose capability they strongly disparage. Yet the Corpo-
ration, so far as this writer could ascertain, applies little pressure on
offenders or incompetents to improve their ways. Corporation offi-
cials have pictured medical organizations as unresponsive to com-
plaints and requests to be stern. Persons within the organizations
deny this characterization. They declare that complaints have actu-
ally been few and that those few have been ill documented; they add
that scant use has been made of available means of stimulating bet-
ter behavior on the part of possibly though not demonstrably delin-
quent doctors.
8 6
85 This appears to be true whether the alleged misconduct has to do with medicine
or, simply, money. Instances of doctors submitting bills to the ACC for services they
never performed have been well authenticated, but have not led to criminal prosecu-
tions. Knowingly false certification that a patient suffered an accidental injury or is still
incapacitated after he has recovered is not a rarity. In 1980 a civil suit was brought by
the ACC against a practitioner who had "negligently and in breach of contract" certified
untruthfully that a patient had suffered incapacity as a result of personal injury by acci-
dent. Before discovering the falsity of the certification, the ACC had paid out $10,000,
which it now sought to recover. The case was settled by the doctor's paying damages in
a substantial sum. Even this utilization of a conventional civil remedy to emphasize the
importance of careful medical certification was ill regarded. The ACC has not since
proceeded in this manner.
86 Means do indeed exist. The Medical Practitioners Act creates a lofty Medical
Council that has power to register and to de-register (permanently or for periods up to
twelve months) medical practitioners, as well as to fine those who are found to have
been "guilty of disgraceful conduct in a professional respect." [1968] 1 N.Z. Stat. 417.
Anybody may complain in writing. All the members of the Medical Council, except pos-
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Occasions for considering at least an admonition are not diffi-
cult to discover. A surgeon, instead of performing a simple curet-
tage, removed a young woman's uterus; he had failed to read the
notes that explicitly told him which operation he was to perform on
this particular patient. A general practitioner billed the Accident
Compensation Corporation for services rendered to the patients he
purportedly served; at the dollar rate approved by the Corporation,
his charges added up to an astonishing and unbelievable total-to
have earned the amount sought he would have had to see patients at
a phenomenally rapid rate throughout twelve hour days, six days a
week. Another general practitioner in instance after instance certi-
fied that his patients who were motorcyclists suffered from a health
condition which made wearing a protective helmet inadvisable. His
certification suspended the need to comply with an otherwise appli-
cable regulation about the use of protective headgear. By odd coin-
cidence all the persons involved, without exception, proved to be
members of a motorcycle gang ostentatiously committed to ruffianly
bravado rather than prudence. Yet another physician, thrice con-
sulted about changes in a patient's digestive comfort, neither ex-
amined the patient nor referred him to a physician who could and
would examine him; the patient at last went elsewhere upon his own
initiative and was then found to have an intestinal malignancy, fortu-
nately still operable. "War stories" like these are told by personnel
in Corporation offices in all parts of New Zealand. Some may per-
haps come under the heading of good yarns, but many (like that
involving the uterus-removing surgeon) are reflected in officially re-
ported "medical misadventure" cases.
Deterrents. The threat of having to pay her injured patients large
sums of money theoretically deters an American doctor from being
careless. Even in theory, as well as in real life, that deterrent has
been minuscule in New Zealand since 1974. No study has shown
that, as a consequence, the quality of medical service has suffered.
A thorough investigation of automotive accidents during the
sibly the Director-General of Health, are themselves medical practitioners; most of them
are nominees of various professional associations. The Act also provides for the Medi-
cal Practitioners Disciplinary Committee, four of whose five members are directly ap-
pointed by the Medical Association. The Disciplinary Committee deals with charges
from any source that a registered medical practitioner has engaged in "professional mis-
conduct," which is something less than "disgraceful conduct." A finding of guilt may
lead to a moderate fine and to censure, with a right of appeal to the Medical Council Id.
In addition to these statutory mechanisms, medical societies say that they are ready,
able, and willing to join with the ACC in having an informal and confidential face-to-face
discussion with a practitioner about whose dutifulness the ACC has misgivings. This




first seven years of operations under the Accident Compensation
Act concluded that
the removal of tort liability for personal injury in New Zealand has
apparently had no adverse effect on driving habits. In fact, statis-
tics show a decline in accident and fatality rates .... [C]learly the
removal of tort rights for personal injury cases did not produce
the increase in accident-producing behavior predicted by the
traditional theory of tort deterrence.
87
In respect of automotive mishaps, however, sometimes active
enforcement of laws and regulations aimed at driving while intoxi-
cated or in a reckless manner are external deterrents. Moreover,
new safety measures (for example, requiring motorcyclists to use
helmets and motorists to fasten seat belts) no doubt help reduce the
severity of accidents that do still occur.
In respect of accidental personal injury related to medical treat-
ment, no before-and-after statistics are available to demonstrate that
medical mishaps do or do not occur more frequently now that law-
suits for medical malpractice have been barred. External deterrents,
akin to police officers' enforcement of automotive traffic laws and
regulations, do exist, but are too rarely used to be regarded as sig-
nificant controls of medical doctors' behavior. During a fairly rigor-
ous inquiry in 1987, this writer heard no expression of opinion in
New Zealand that instances of malpractice had risen after the Acci-
dent Compensation Act became operative. Since external controls
have been so little used, one must conclude that New Zealand relies
upon a sense of professional responsibility, with its central core of
self-esteem coupled with self-discipline, to be the most potent de-
terrent of medical misbehavior. 88
Still, an occasional publicized scolding of those few whose con-
duct has discernibly not measured up to acceptable standards might
87 Brown, Deterrence and No-Fault: The New Zealand Experience, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 976,
1002 (1985).
88 The thought has been expressed in the United States, too, that "the non-rmone-
tary costs of an accusation," rather than the possibility of adverse financial conse-
quences, are what really cause a doctor to practice medicine in a way that will minimize
the possibility of later accusations. See Kemper, supra note 14, at 1146; see also Bell, Legis-
lative Intrusion Into the Common Law of Medical Malpractice: Thoughts About the Deterrent Effect
of Tort Liability, 35 SviAcusx L. REv. 939, 985 (1984) (commenting that malpractice law-
suit serves as "a negative sanction" because it consumes "the doctor's limited time and
energy" and threatens "his relations with his patients"). Bell doubts that the economic
aspect of malpractice liability has the deterrent effect others ascribe to it; he documents
his belief that "the psychological approach" provides "a more fruitful guide to judg-
ments about the deterrent effects of liability rules." Id. The author refers to physicians'
belief, whether or not well founded, that an adverse judgment in a malpractice lawsuit
results in "social stigma, loss of prestige, embarrassment, time, anxiety and the like." Id.
at 992.
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usefully remind others what those standards are. 89 Expression of
either professional or official disapprobation is a rarity in New Zea-
land. Occasionally one hears discussion about creating new mecha-
nisms for receiving and acting upon complaints concerning the
functioning of medical doctors and diverse health care providers.
Thus far little has been done to strengthen processes that might
serve as external deterrents of shortcomings. In fact, so far as this
writer learned, no means now exist for computerized storage of
complaints and other bits of information that might, as they accu-
mulate, point the need for investigation of a particular hospital, pro-
cedure, or individual. New Zealanders seemingly maintain an
extraordinarily strong confidence in the medical profession and all it
touches. 90
III
A FEW QUESTIONS AND TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS
Doubts about the malpractice system. During recent decades medical
malpractice proceedings in the United States have increased in
number, though not to the ungovernable dimensions insurance and
medical spokesmen sometimes suggest.9 1 The number of physi-
cians has grown, too, as has the population in general. Hence, up-
ward movement in the volume of claims is not in itself surprising.
More significant than population figures in influencing the number
89 Cf Colimore, Doctor Cut from Medicare; Led Review Panel, Phila. Inquirer, April 25,
1987, at 1, col. 1: "[A doctor] was barred from the program after the state determined
that he had charged it for 269 'medically unnecessary' office visits. Dr. [name stated]
also was cited for billing the state for 'inferior services' involving 16 patients who re-
ceived electrocardiograms that state officials said were of 'little or no therapeutic or
diagnostic value.'" Full details of these shortcomings were included in the news story,
which presumably appeared in other cities' newspapers and thus probably came to the
notice of most Pennsylvania practitioners.
90 What appears to be confidence may in actuality simply be awareness that in some
parts of New Zealand one's choices as a patient are somewhat limited. In December
1986 an internal ACC document indicated that when, for example, the Accident Com-
pensation Corporation itself sought to refer a patient to any one of the four orthopedic
surgeons in Palmerston North, a delay of twelve to eighteen months occurred before an
appointment could be had; then another six to eight weeks passed before the ACC re-
ceived a report concerning the patient's condition. In Gisborne, the scheduling of ap-
pointments with one of the four specialists (undifferentiated) required waits of two to six
months; reports of the specialists' findings came "up to 3 months" later. In New Plym-
outh the appointment delays with specialists other than general surgeons ranged from
two to three and one-half months; the reports in most instances arrived two to four
weeks afterward. "General Surgeons," unlike other specialists in that area, were appar-
ently very prompt in arranging appointments and rendering reports. These examples
suggest that specialized medical service may be in such short supply and heavy demand
that at least some patients may be inclined to take whatever they get without grumbling
loudly or often.
91 For effective statistical analysis, see Danzon, New Evidence, supra note 15, at 57,
and P. DANZON, supra note 25, at 58-83.
202 [Vol. 73:170
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
of malpractice actions, however, is the increasing urbanization of
America. Utilization of medical services tends to be more general in
cities than in the countryside. In addition, exposure to novel, com-
plex surgical procedures is more likely to be experienced in urban
than in rural hospitals. City dwellers may therefore face greater risk
of injuries than do their country cousins. This is, as it were, the
price they pay for greater possibility of overcoming ill health. The
mere fact that malpractice cases abound is not in itself reason to halt
or to diminish them.
On the other hand, preserving them simply because they have
become a familiar feature of the landscape is imprudent. If litigation
concerning injuries allegedly caused by improper medical practices
has been an effective means of deterring the delivery of substandard
care, then evidence of effectiveness should by now be readily avail-
able. Seemingly it is not.
9 2
Cause does exist, however, for believing that the malpractice
system has had undesired consequences. Earlier discussion has
touched upon the expense of insurance, 93 the withdrawal of medical
services in connection with high risk activities,94 and the apparently
mounting tendency to engage in "defensive medicine" that enables
92 Objective analysts have concluded that "almost no systematic investigation exists
on how malpractice experience affects medical quality or vice versa." Zuckerman, Koller
& Bovbj erg, Information on Malpractice: A Review of Empirical Research on Major Policy Issues,
49 LAw & CorTEmp. PROBS., Spring 1986, at 85, 87 [hereinafter Zuckerman].
93 See supra text accompanying notes 11-12. But cf Zuckerman, supra note 92, at 92
(doubting that the problem of "affordability of malpractice premiums" was as wide-
spread as often asserted, "even though the-burden for certain specialists (for example,
obstetricians) and physicians in certain areas or states (such as New York) is well above
national averages"). The Zuckerman study drew mainly upon data that do not reflect
the massive increases in insurance premiums since 1980. See also Grad, supra note 15, at
1071-75 (reporting that it is "now generally agreed that [the medical malpractice crisis]
was a crisis not of medical malpractice but of insurance availability").
94 See supra notes 11 & 27 and accompanying text. S. LAw & S. POLAN, PAIN AND
PROFIT: THE PoLrrics OF MALPRACTICE 116-17 (1978) reported that forty-three states
had enacted "Good Samaritan Statutes" to protect a medical person against malpractice
suits if he seeks to help in an emergency situation encountered outside the office or
hospital. Even after the statutes' enactment, about half the doctors surveyed some years
ago expressed doubt about stopping to render aid to persons injured in a traffic acci-
dent. See also Zuckerman, supra note 92, at 109, which refers to a 1985 survey by the
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists that showed 23 percent of obste-
tricians had reduced the number of high risk pregnancies they would agree to treat, and
12 percent had given up obstetrics altogether because of the malpractice risk. The
American Medical Association found in 1983 that over one-third of the then practicing
physicians had begun refusing certain types of cases they had previously accepted.
Compare MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, supra note 26, at 43, asserting that 40 percent of the
47,000 members of the American College of Surgeons had given up "admittedly vulner-
able parts" of their practice, while an equally large segment of the American College of
Obstetrics and Gynecology had "altered their practice in some way." See also Woman in
Florida, Shot in Back, Waits 13 Hours for Surgery, N.Y. Times, Aug. 9, 1987, at A2 1, col. 4:
Edwina Haynes, who had been shot in the back and had no health insur-
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a doctor to assert he left no stone unturned, without in fact benefit-
ting a patient whose well-being depends on clues not buried be-
neath stones. 95
Viewed simply as a system of compensation-that is, a system of
making whole the person who has suffered loss as a result of an-
other's fault-medical malpractice litigation seems also to fall far
short of its goal. Many "potentially compensable events," as review-
ers of hospital records characterize the seemingly negligent treat-
ments provided patients, 96 do not result in litigation because the
injuries are minor 97 or for other reasons (including the individual
patient's ignorance). As for all medical injuries, suffered in hospi-
tals or elsewhere, for which a claim for compensation had been filed,
fifty-seven percent of the claims were rejected without any payment
at all. The payments that were made have been analyzed and re-
analyzed by well qualified (and sometimes wholly objective) persons
without arriving at a clear consensus concerning their adequacy.
Some evidence exists that successful claimants whose economic
losses were toward the lower end of the scale "tended to be
overcompensated, while those with higher losses were undercom-
ance, waited for 13 hours before doctors could find a hospital that would
accept her for surgery, a hospital official has charged.
"We called 14 neurosurgeons and six hospitals, and some just simply
said 'I'm not interested in her because I'm not interested in a lawsuit,'"
said Dr. Richard Thomas, director of emergency services at Glades Gen-
eral Hospital here.
Glades General has never had a neurosurgeon and had to transfer
Ms. Haynes... The bullet damaged her spinal cord and pierced her liver.
On the hospital's 20th call, Tampa General agreed to accept Ms.
Haynes, and she was flown 150 miles Thursday afternoon to the Gulf
Coast hospital....
But the task of finding a suitable hospital was complicated by recent
moves by hundreds of South Florida physicians to cut back or quit prac-
tice in the face of record malpractice insurance rates. Malpractice premi-
ums for Dade and Broward County neurosurgeons average $192,420 a
year. The statewide average is $102,339.
95 See supra note 26 and accompanying text; see also S. LAw & S. POLAN, supra note
94, at 115 (reporting that 70% of doctors responding to an AMA poll believe they are
practicing defensive medicine although empirical studies cast doubt on this self-ap-
praisal); Bell, supra note 88, at 971 (doubting that the dividing line between defensive
medicine and simply thoroughgoing medicine is clear, but remarking: " . . . [S]urveys
indicate that 50 to 70% of doctors say they practice defensive medicine. It is reasonable
to assume that where there is so much smoke, there must be some fire."); Zuckerman,
supra note 92, at 108, and sources cited (authors have no doubt about the increased costs
attributable to defensive medicine, such as superfluous tests and x-rays, but are skeptical
of attempts to compute the precise dollar amount of the cost, as the American Medical
Association had done in 1984: $15.1 billion).
96 See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
97 See supra note 2.
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pensated"; 98 one study, indeed, concluded that undercompensation
was the norm, whatever be the actual level of economic loss.99 On
the other hand, some evidence shows that the more severe injuries
do lead to higher compensation; if severity of injury does in fact
largely determine the extent of the victim's economic loss (a debatable
proposition), one can argue that the distribution of compensation is
fairer than many have thought. 100
In any event, malpractice proceedings leave fifty-seven percent
of claimants uncompensated, though injured, and many who have
never become claimants have also suffered injuries without being
indemnified. On the basis of data compiled in the mid-1970s, more-
over, analysts were able to conclude that only one of 150 persons
injured while in California hospitals received any compensation
whatever. 1 1 Even if, as seems to be true, the filing of claims has
become somewhat more frequent in the 1980s, one is left with the
sense that the balm of money is not being liberally applied to
wounds incurred during medical treatment.
Accomplishments of the New Zealand plan. Concentrating as it does
on the fact of injury rather than on the issue of culpability, New
Zealand has not encountered precisely the same problems that have
beset the American malpractice system. In New Zealand people are
compensated for medically caused injuries that "arose out of and in
the course of" treatment, just as is true in America in the now famil-
iar field of workers' compensation for persons who have suffered
injuries arising out of and in the course of employment.
When first introduced in this country in the early twentieth cen-
tury, some years later than in New Zealand, many regarded the idea
of developing a workers' compensation system as heretical. Now
the notion of providing compensation for injured employees, with-
out inquiry into blameworthiness, is accepted without demur. Like
New Zealand's accidental injury law, American workers' compensa-
tion laws measure compensation by formulas and schedules that ex-
clude the possibility of extravagantly large awards while assuring
somewhat equal treatment of like cases.
98 Zuckerman, supra note 92, at 99-100.
99 Id. at 100. But cf. HHS TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 5, at 16: A study of
claims closed by indemnity payments in 1984 "found that 62 percent of patients com-
pensated received payments greater than their economic loss, 8 percent received a pay-
ment equal to their loss, and 30 percent received a payment less than their loss.
However, these figures represent compensation paid before the claimants' attorneys'
fees were subtracted."
100 This is the view taken by P. DANZON & L. LILLARD, THE RESOLUrION OF MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE CLAIMs 23-24, 31 (1982). For further analysis of payments made as a con-
sequence of malpractice litigation, compared with other types of tort cases, see J.
KAKALICK & N. PACE, supra note 6.
101 Zuckerman, supra note 92, at 99.
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The workers' compensation system has gained acceptance also
because its simplified administration does truly reduce costs of op-
eration. In the United States the bulk of employers' insurance pre-
miums is actually expended for those who are the intended
beneficiaries of the workers' compensation law, injured workers. 102
That is true as well in New Zealand, where the Accident Compensa-
tion Act has absorbed the preexisting industrial injury law and gone
beyond it into new territory. The payments experience in New Zea-
land in respect of medical injuries is markedly different from that of
the United States, where only a minor fraction of the malpractice
insurance dollar reaches injured persons' pockets. 10 3
Doubts persist, nonetheless, about whether New Zealand's thus
far successful effort to provide ready compensation for accidental
injuries is significant for the United States. New Zealand's compen-
sation for noneconomic consequences of injury (such as "loss of
amenities of life" or "pain and suffering") is far, far smaller than the
exciting prizes Americans have become accustomed to reading
about in their newspapers.10 4 To bring under control unrealistically
heightened expectations stirred by the present malpractice lottery
will be a political feat of substantial difficulty.
Then, too, New Zealand's system works without any great fric-
tion between the Accident Compensation Corporation and the mass
of its "clients" (that is, the claimants) because the Corporation has
avoided creating an adversary atmosphere. It does not act as though
it were, say, an insurance company whose profitability would be en-
larged if payment of claims were minimized. Rather, it administers a
social insurance system that involves no contests between opposed
interests, but only an inquiry to establish that the claimants have
met the conditions of entitlement. Even when judgments about the
precise cause of a discernible injury are difficult to make with utter
confidence (as they often are), the Corporation approaches the task
without a predisposition to oppose the claim, but, rather, with a
readiness to act upon presumably disinterested medical advice.
Are state governments in this country prepared (a) to adopt a
method of financing that excludes the need of buying insurance
from private companies and (b) to develop an administrative style
that eliminates the need for many services lawyers now profitably
render defendants and plaintiffs? When New Zealand inaugurated
its accident compensation scheme in the early 1970s, medical mal-
practice did not bulk large in the affairs of either the insurance busi-
102 See HHS TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 5, at 16.
103 See supra note 6 and accompanying text; supra note 67.
104 See supra note 8 and accompanying text; see also Tancredi, Designing a No-Fault
Alternative, 49 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1986, at 277.
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ness or the legal profession. The situation in America today is
different. One may anticipate that "socialization" would be sturdily
resisted here; self-interest and ideology would commingle in oppo-
sition. This does not mean that the New Zealand approach should
be ignored. It means only that transferability would not be easily
achieved.
Lessening the risk of substandard medical care. The risk of substan-
dard medical care remains large in both countries because neither
of them has vigorously sought to call to account those whose pa-
tients have suffered. Note must be taken, however, of occasional
awakenings from lethargy. 10 5 More awakenings are needed.
In the United States some experience has been had with main-
taining rosters of physicians who are deemed qualified to render
services in connection with the functioning of a particular adminis-
trative agency. This is true, for example, in the workers' compensa-
tion systems of a number of states. A doctor whose level of probity
or performance is found to be objectionably low in that context may
be removed from the particular roster without infringing upon the
authority of other governmental or professional bodies concerned
with licensing and disciplining physicians. Even when an adminis-
trative body possesses this power to act in self-defense, the power
has thus far been diffidently exercised in the United States. 10 6 The
105 See supra text accompanying notes 69-74; see also Brinkley, State Medical Boards
Disciplined Record Number of Doctors in '85, N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1986, at 1, col. 1 (reporting
that state agencies had disciplined a "record number of doctors in 1985," almost 60
percent more than in 1984).
106 N.Y. WORK. COMP. LAw § 13-d(2) (McKinney 1965), for example, authorizes the
chairman of the compensation board to revoke the authorization of a physician to re-
ceive fees for rendering medical services in matters within that board's authority, if the
physician has been found (after suitable procedures) to have been "guilty of profes-
sional or other misconduct or incompetency" in that kind of activity. A quarter of a
century ago this power was used only nine times in three years, during which 28,439
physicians were on the board's roster. Gellhorn & Lauer, Administration of the New York
Workmen's Compensation Law (pt. 3), 37 N.Y.U. L. REv. 564, 587-88 (1962). "A sanction
so infrequently used despite freely expressed dissatisfaction with licensees' behavior, is
unlikely to influence the adequacy of medical treatment or the moderation of charges for
professional services." Id. During the years 1984 through 1987, the power seems to
have been used only once, so far as could be recalled by seemingly knowledgeable offi-
cials.
A 1982 statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-5(b) (1982), authorizes the Federal Health Care
Financing Administration, acting on a recommendation by a local peer review organiza-
tion, to disqualify a doctor from receiving payments under Medicare if she "grossly and
flagrantly" violates standards of care or if she commits a "substantial [violation] in a
substantial number of cases." Examples of utilization of the new process appear supra
notes 79 & 89. But see Medicare Panels Accused of Laxity-Nader Aide Asserts Statistics Show that
Physicians Fail to Police Their Peers, N.Y. Times, Oct. 27, 1987, at A25, col. 4.
See also False Claims Amendments Act of 1986, 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729 (West Supp.
1987) (providing financial incentives for reporting overcharges in federal programs).
N.Y. Times, Sept. 10, 1987, at 25, col. 1, reports a proceeding initiated by a doctor
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power does not exist even on paper in New Zealand. Neither New
Zealand nor the United States has developed a firm resolve to deal
administratively (rather than by civil litigation or prosecutions for
violation of penal statutes) with recurringly deficient behavior by a
physician.
A doctor who has made a mistake in his professional work, as
most doctors (like most other people) probably have done, may be
sued in America, but the outcome of an isolated lawsuit does not
show him to be a menace to future patients. So, too, an erroneous
report or an exaggerated claim for money not actually owed is of
course deplorable and is cause for censure; but an isolated misdeed,
not shown to be an element of a pattern that suggests grave moral
laxity, is scarcely sufficient cause to bring the heavy artillery into
play. The case is different, however, when an official body responsi-
ble for administering a program of social insurance or health pro-
tection can fairly find that a physician who shares in this
responsibility is persistently undercutting the administration. This
occurs when evidence exists that the doctor has been repeatedly in-
ept, repeatedly uninformed, or repeatedly given to the use of unsafe
methods of practice, thus endangering those meant to be served; it
occurs, too, when a doctor is shown to have exploited his position of
trust by frequently making misleading statements in furtherance of
against a former colleague who had accused him of defrauding Medicare by billing for
unnecessary or unperformed surgery.
See also N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1987, at 1, col. 6:
The Administration is drafting a major proposal to use price incen-
tives and lists of selected doctors to help control the volume of physician
services provided to 31 million elderly and disabled people through the
Medicare program.
Dr. William L. Roper, head of the Medicare agency, said today that
under the proposal, the Government would "steer Medicare patients to-
ward certain doctors who practice a conservative style of medicine, who
have a proven track record of providing appropriate medical care without
unnecessary utilization of services."
Under the proposal .... Medicare would pay more of patients' bills if
they went to doctors who made special efforts to eliminate unnecessary
services. But beneficiaries would get no discount and might have to pay
more of the bill themselves if they went to doctors with a history of order-
ing what the Government considers excessive tests, office visits or medi-
cal procedures.
The Government would publicize the names of "preferred provid-
ers ....
Dr. Roper said that the proposal would, to some extent, "impinge on
doctors' ability to make decisions with respect to their patients."
Dr. Roper said the Government could monitor a doctor's "practice
pattern" by measuring, for example, the number and frequency of office
visits, X-rays, electrocardiograms, laboratory tests and other procedures.
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his or others' interests at the expense of the program he ostensibly
serves. When instances of these kinds come to light, self-protective
measures should be available and should be used.
An uncomplicated measure to lessen the hazard of poor medi-
cal judgment has been encouraged, though not as yet widely re-
quired, in the United States. This is, very simply, obtaining a
second opinion concerning need, feasibility, and procedure before
surgery is undertaken. 10 7 Medico-legal lore is full of anecdotal ref-
erences to unnecessary or bungled surgery, some instances of which
attracted judicial attention.
After a lengthy trial that had converted his courtroom into "a
Grand Guignol of medical horrors," a California judge found that the
defendant who stood before him was a persistent bungler who had
abused the confidence reposed in him by inflicting his incompe-
tence on the unsuspecting and defenseless public. [He] for nine
years made a practice of performing unnecessary surgery, and
performing it badly, simply to line his pockets....
.... Evidence was adduced as to 38 patients and, since several
underwent multiple surgeries, something in excess of 50
operations....
[The defendant] made a practice of operating not only on the
basis of inadequate preoperative findings, but also on the basis of
false findings....
Another practice [he followed] was to operate on patients
without giving them a period of conservative treatment within the
hospital .... 108
The case was undoubtedly aberrational, both as to the extent of the
harm done and as to the doctor's motivation. The sordid tale never-
theless points up the desirability of double checking more routinely
than has been commonplace in some areas.
A number of American insurance companies do today actively
encourage all patients who face elective surgery to obtain second
opinions at the companies' expense. Many hospitals as well as pub-
lic authorities call for second opinions or for various other means of
monitoring surgical plans and performances. 10 9 Similar measures
107 See supra note 32.
108 S. LAw & S. PoLAN, supra note 94, at 215, 217, 225. The entire sad story of the
surgeon's misdeeds and of a hospital's negligence in failing to detect them is set forth id.
in at 215-45.
109 See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2803(1)(e) (McKinney 1985). For a critical
evaluation of the second opinion system, see Grad, supra note 15, at 1070-71 (discussing
assertions that "thousands of deaths occur each year as a result of unnecessary
surgery").
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may not be feasible in a country (or in a portion of a country) that
has only a small medico-surgical population.
Better records systems. Those who concentrate on preventing mis-
haps rather than on worrying chiefly about their consequences have
recently sought improved systems for recording and using informa-
tion about hospitalized patients. Patient care has come to be more a
group enterprise than a solo performance. Jottings on pieces of pa-
per are regarded in some hospitals as inadequately enlightening
about a patient's status, needs, and prospects. A clinical observa-
tion, a test report, a notation of steps taken or proposed to be taken,
and the like can be recorded for computerization and ready re-
trieval, to be used by all the team members whose judgments and
actions may have a bearing on the patient's progress toward good
health. In both New Zealand and the United States improved infor-
mation management might well lead to avoiding some of the
problems that now beget demands for redress."10
Specialization as affecting patients' attitudes. The prevalence of
teamwork in many branches of patient care bears also on the gen-
eral public's changing perceptions of the medical profession. Not
many generations ago the medical profession's image in the public's
mind was that of "the old family doctor," full of wisdom and sympa-
thy and seemingly with time to spare for a bedside visit to a patient
for what might today be regarded as a session of psychotherapy.
Confidence in the family doctor's wizardry reflected belief that med-
ical science was far more comprehensive and precise than in fact it
has proved to be; the patient's unquestioning reliance on the sup-
posed expert's judgment concerning diagnosis and treatment of
medical problems was the norm.
Medicine's increased specialization in the present day has
changed all that. When, as is now frequent in the United States,
several physicians may be occupied in delivering various portions of
a patient's care, the patient has no single authority figure to whom
he entrusts his fate. In New Zealand, as soon as the need for a spe-
cialist has been perceived, the doctor whom the patient does know
(the general practitioner) refers him to one with whom he has had
no relationship. The new master of his fate functions in a hospital
often located far from the patient's home and other emotional
supports.
Whether in New Zealand or in the United States, the old-fash-
ioned doctor-patient relationship is unlikely to develop as once it
110 The important part played by hospital and medical records in American malprac-
tice litigation is explained in a leading. treatise, D. HARNEY, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
§§ 20.1-20.4 (2d ed. 1987).
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readily did."1' Discussing that relationship, the American Associa-
tion of Retired Persons, purportedly speaking for a membership of
25 million, asserted that American physicians in general had done
little to improve their rapport with patients and that
the problem has been exacerbated by increasing numbers of spe-
cialists. These specialists or surgeons are often brought in by the
primary care physician. Frequently, they never even have a con-
versation with the patient. When something goes wrong, since
there has been so little contact, the patient is left with his/her own
perceptions as to what should have occurred. 112
Statistical evidence supports the hypothesis that lack of commu-
nication between the providers and the recipients of medical treat-
ment has heightened disappointed patients' readiness to sue
doctors. Those medical specialists who managed to spend a bit of
time with patients incurred fewer claims than did their more imper-
sonal colleagues."
13
Possibly more important in the long term than anything having
to do directly with malpractice or compensation systems is con-
scious consideration of the need for a collaborative relationship be-
tween doctors and patients as an element of successful health care
111 See MAY 1987 GAO REPORT, supra note 36, at 19:
Deteriorating patient-physician relationships are also a result of the in-
creasing specialization in medicine. Today, several physicians may be in-
volved in delivering medical care to the patient. This increases the
(1) likelihood that breakdowns in communication may occur between the
patient and physician, increasing the degree of disappointment and dis-
satisfaction when the outcomes of medical care fall short of what was ex-
pected, and (2) need for improved patient-physician communication and
better education of patients about the potential risks and outcomes asso-
ciated with various medical treatments.
112 FEB. 1986 GAO REPORT, supra note 9, at 35. The deterioration in relationship
cuts both ways, according to Bell, supra note 88, at 985, who asserts that "[t]he malprac-
tice process" has adversely affected an important aspect of the physician's work, namely,
his relations with his patients.
The faith of patients in the physician and their gratitude for the care
given them are attractive elements of practice for those interested and
desirous of caring for others. The threat of malpractice litigation, how-
ever, turns every patient into a potential adversary. That potential adver-
sariness is likely to interfere with the positive relationships with patients
that make medical practice more enjoyable.
Id. (footnote omitted).
113 Zuckerman, supra note 92, at 97; cf Epstein, supra note 67, at 89: "Others will
have to determine if the sharp increase in malpractice actions is attributable to the in-
creasing depersonalization of modern medical care-itself the apparent by-product of
the ever more technical, ever more specialized nature of modern medical practice." But
cf Law, A Consumer Perspective on Medical Malpractice, 49 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring
1986, at 310-I1 ("Doctors can do unreasonably dangerous things for a considerable
period of time without being sued, particularly if the physician has congenial personal
relationships with patients, colleagues, and hospital administrators.").
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
programs.1 4 A paper concerning problems of law and its adminis-
tration is not an appropriate setting for extended discussion of this
topic. The topic nevertheless deserves mention here because the
debilitation or the development of sound relationships between pa-
tients and their health care providers may sharply affect the shaping
and functioning of legal systems that deal with unsatisfactory medi-
cal outcomes.
114 Dr. Jay Katz (physician, psychoanalyst, and Yale law professor) has written elo-
quently and persuasively about the worth of patient participation in decisionmaking and
about the difficulty of overcoming physicians' concern that their more generously shar-
ing decisional authority may beget fresh difficulties. SeeJ. KATz, THE SILENT WORLD OF
DOCTOR AND PATIENT (1984) (especially ch. IV, "Sharing Authority: The Willingness to
Trust"); see also HHS TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 5, at 102-03.
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